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METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION IN THE WAKE
OF MILLIKEN-ON LOSING BIG BATTLES AND

WINNING SMALL WARS: THE VIEW
LARGELY FROM WITHIN
ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley' has been
regarded as a major defeat in the effort to bring about metropolitan

desegregation2 and as a decision that in effect "allow[s] our great
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. Visiting Professor of Law, Washington University, 1976. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. 418 U.S.717 (1974).
2. Dell'Ario, Remedies for School Segregation: A Limit on The Equity Power of
the FederalCourts?, 2 HAST. CON. L.Q. 113, 149 (1975); Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use Litigation
Strategies, 24 CAT. U.L. REv. 187, 188 (1975); Taylor, The Supreme Court and Urban
Reality: A Tactical Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE L REv. 751 (1975); The
Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAiv. L. REv. 61, 69-71 (1974); Comment, Milliken v.
Bradley in HistoricalPerspective: The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle, 69 Nw. U.L.
REv. 799, 818-19 (1975). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON Crvm RIGHTS, MILLIKEN V.
B]ADLEY: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION (Conference, Nov. 9,
1974); Symposium-Milliken v. Bradley and the Future of Urban School Desegregation,
21 WAYNE L. REv. 751 (1975). Taylor takes the position that in the long run
metropolitan desegregation can be effectively achieved only by concentrating on governmental responsibility for segregated housing and the resulting racial containment in the
schools. This tactic, hopefully, will persuade the Court that racial factors are "responsible for the fact that the great mass of urban black children attend segregated public
schools." Taylor, supra, at 778. To do this, it will be necessary to put together "a
record so compelling that it will not permit the Court to countenance continued urban
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metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities-one white, the
other black." 3 Indeed, it is true that in Milliken a "big battle" was lost.
No longer can urban and suburban school district lines be crossed to
obtain metropolitan desegregation merely by invoking the theory that
the state's overall responsibility for public education justifies imposing
an interdistrict remedy whenever necessary to eliminate effectively de
jure segregation. In Miliken the Court decided in favor of local
autonomy rather than state responsibility and interpreted the fourteenth
amendmenes guarantee of equal protection to take into consideration
this local autonomy of state units as represented by separate school
districts. At the same time, however, the Court expressly recognized
that federal courts do have the power to cross school district lines for
desegregation purposes in appropriate cases, stating:
Of course, no state law is above the Constitution. School district
lines ...are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate reme4
dies.
To be sure, the import of Milliken was that "school district lines may
[not] be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience" 5 and that the lines may not be crossed by showing only that an
urban district was guilty of practicing de jure segregation. Nevertheless, the lines can be crossed "where there has been a constitutional
violation calling for interdistrict relief." Thus, although the "big battle" has been lost, the quest for metropolitan desegregation has not
necessarily come to an end. 7
In the wake of Milliken, the proponents of metropolitan desegregation and their lawyers have had to pick up the pieces and start over, this
time concentrating on "winning small wars." The amazing thing-or
perhaps not so amazing once the "behavioral dynamic" of Milliken is
fully understood-is that they have been fairly successful in this process.
apartheid by rationalizing that its labors in eliminating governmentally imposed racial
constraints have been successfully completed." Id.
3. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 815 (1974) (Marshall, I., dissenting).
4. 418 U.S. at 744.
5. Id. at 741.
6. Id.
7. Some commentators disagree:
The nation and the courts are weary of twenty years of school segregation
litigation. Prior to its decision in Detroit, the Court had begun to indicate
that it will decline to interfere in local school plans for desegregation that are
in general accord with the strictures of Swann. For the majority at least,
Detroit should be the end of the line in the school desegregation cases.
Dell'Ario, supra note 2, at 149 (footnotes omitted).
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At least in the cases in which the question has been litigated, the lower

federal courts usually have found reasons to justify crossing school
district lines and granting interdistrict relief.

The purpose of this

Article is to analyze the problem of metropolitan desegregation in light
of both Milliken and these post-Milliken developments and to discuss
what I believe to be the proper strategy in seeking metropolitan desegregation today, the strategy of winning small wars.
As the title indicates, this analysis and discussion will come "largely
from within," based on my experiences as counsel in litigation designed

to achieve metropolitan desegregation in Louisville-Jefferson County,

Kentucky.8 When the Supreme Court decided Milliken, it remanded
the Louisville case for further consideration in light of Milliken. I have
previously approached legal questions "from without and within," that
is, from the perspective of an academician who is also a part-time

movement lawyer,9 but in this Article, I have gone even beyond the
"without and within" approach and have approached the matter essen-

tially from the perspective of the lawyer seeking to achieve metropolitan
desegregation.

This Article presents, first, a discussion of the character of the problem of metropolitan desegregation and why urban and suburban school
district lines must be crossed for there to be meaningful desegregation
8. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
9. See Sedler, The Procedural Defense in Selective Service Prosecutions: The
View from Without and Within, 56 IowA L. REV. 1123 (1971); Sedler, The Summary
Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and Within, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REV. - (1976); Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social
Change: Reflections from Without and Within (pts. 1-2), 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 237, 629
(1970); Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and
Within, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1. See also Sedler, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J 1070
(1971). I believe that such an approach has much to commend it. It is not, of course,
the approach of the impartial and dispassionate legal scholar, and to the extent that these
characteristics are considered virtues, their absence must be noted by the reader. On the
other hand, there is perhaps an existential as well as an objective component to legal
scholarship, and there are perhaps insights to be gained by participation and involvement
that detached observation cannot supply.
There are many varieties of "movement" lawyers. Some are full-time employees of
movement or civil rights organizations. A larger number are lawyers engaged in private
practice who devote considerable time to taking such cases, generally without compensation. And some, like the present author, are law professors who venture forth from the
.groves of academe."
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of many urban school districts. Second is a presentation of the legal
posture and societal setting in which the question of metropolitan desegregation arises. Third is an examination of the Milliken litigation
in terms of the cases leading up to the decision, the theory advanced
by the plaintiffs, the basis of the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions, and the significance of the decision as a guide to future developments in this area. Fourth is a discussion of what I believe to
be the proper strategy in the wake of Milliken, as illustrated by the
Louisville-Jefferson County litigation and other "contemporary Milliken" cases. Concluding the Article is a forecast of future developments.
II.

METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION:

THE CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM

Stated simply, the problem of metropolitan desegregation results from
placing the responsibility for public education in local school districts,
which are often organized along urban-suburban lines. Because the
blacks in most metropolitan areas are concentrated in the central cities
and seldom reside in the suburban areas, an urban school district will
necessarily have a high percentage of blacks while the suburban districts
will be substantially white in composition. Depending on the relative
size of the urban district's black population, it may be impossible to
achieve effective desegregation and elimination of predominantly black
schools within that district alone. More significantly, desegregation of
the urban district alone may actually be counterproductive. Experience
indicates that such desegregation accelerates the general movement of
middle-class' ° whites to the suburban school districts so that the urban
district soon becomes resegregated, blacker and poorer than before. This
flight to the suburbs to avoid desegregation-what has come to be called
"white flight"--and the resulting resegregation of the urban district can
only be stemmed if there is no place for whites to flee." Since in most
metropolitan areas, where although the population within the central
city is predominantly black, the population within the metropolitan area
10. As used herein, the term "middle class" embraces "upper class" as well.
11. Of course there is always the possibility that whites will flee to private schools,
and efforts must be taken to prevent the state from assisting this flight. See, e.g.,
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit
v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). For the present, however, it will be sufficient to
concentrate on the problem of flight to suburban school districts.
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is predominantly white, desegregation on a metropolitan basis can often

eliminate most, if not all, predominantly black schools.

2

In short, in

many urban areas if desegregation is to be fully effective and if resegre-

gation is to be avoided, it must be imposed on a metropolitan basis
across existing urban-suburban school district lines.
It must be emphasized that we are talking about desegregation within

a functional metropolitan area, where people who live in the suburbs
work in the city, an area which is usually classified as part of a Standard

Metropolitan Statistical Area to indicate that it is an area of "economic
These metropolitan areas are not areas of
and social integration.'
racial integration for housing purposes, however, and the question is

whether they will become areas of racial integration for school purposes
by court decree.

It is unnecessary to enumerate all the factors that have produced, in
the midst of a general population movement to the metropolitan areas,
the present situation in which the cities are becoming blacker, poorer,
and less populous as middle-class whites move out to the surrounding
suburban areas. 14 The result of this movement to the suburbs, particu-

larly the movement of middle-class white families with school-age children, is a pattern of urban school districts with large black populations
surrounded by virtually all-white suburban districts.

In Detroit, for

12. As will be discussed subsequently, the predominantly black school is also a
predominantly lower socio-economic class school. When the effect of desegregation is to
create schools that are majority white, these schools are likely to be predominantly
middle-class in social composition. In such a case the motivation of middle-class whites
to flee to private schools is considerably reduced.
13. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 670 (1974). The tricounty area included in the metropolitan desegregation plan in Milliken was classified as
a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 418 U.S. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
14. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPoRTuNrrY IN SUBURBIA
(1974). If present trends continue, it is estimated that by the year 2000, whites will
comprise only 25 percent of the central city population, while blacks will make up 75
percent. Id. at 4. And while it may be that "the root causes of the concentration of
blacks in the inner cities of America are simply not known," Bradley v. School Bd., 462
F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973),
the location of public housing within urban ghettos and the racially discriminatory
housing practices of real estate developers and brokers, aided and abetted by federal,
state, and local governments, have certainly not facilitated the movement of blacks from
the inner city to the suburbs. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503
F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 421 U.S. 962
(1975); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, Civil No. 68-225 (S.D. Ind., Aug. 1,
1975) (memorandum of decision and judgment); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 422
(D. Del.), afi'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975).
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example, the black population of the Detroit school district was approximately 70 percent and increasing at the time of the Milliken litigation,
while the black school population in the metropolitan area was less than
20 percent.' 5 The same stark statistics prevail in most other urban
areas, north and south,' which leads to the conclusion that a real danger of educational apartheid along school district lines exists today in
17
metropolitan America.
The concept of white flight has been recognized and used by the
courts to describe the general acceleration of the movement of middleclass whites to the suburbs caused by efforts to desegregate urban school
districts.' 8 The concept has been demonstrated empirically in a number
of urban school districts that have reached a "tipping point," the point
at which the percentage of black students attending a particular school
reaches a majority or some other lesser ratio. This point may be
attained either as a result of increased black population in the area
entirely apart from desegregation or as a result of desegregation. When
white children are required to attend schools with a black majority or a
large percentage of black students, the whites perceive these schools as
"black" schools and do not want their children to attend them. Those
white families who have children in these schools and are financially
able to do so are motivated either to move to the suburban districts or to
enroll their children in private schools. Families with children approaching school age will look for housing in the suburban districts to
avoid the risk of their children having to attend predominantly black
15. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 765 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
16. As of 1972, the black school population of Washington, D.C. was 95.5 percent;
of Atlanta, 77.1 percent; of New Orleans, 74.6 percent; of Newark, 72.3 percent; of
Richmond, 70.2 percent; of Gary, 69.6 percent; of Baltimore, 69.3 percent; of St. Louis,
68.8 percent; of Philadelphia, 61.4 percent; of Oakland, 60 percent; of Birmingham, 59.4
percent; of Memphis, 57.8 percent; of Cleveland, 57.6 percent; of Chicago, 57.1 percent;
of Kansas City, Mo., 54.4 percent. In a number of other cities, it was approaching the
50 percent mark, and everywhere it is increasing. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, DIRECTORY OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY ScHooLs IN SELECTED DisTars (1972).
See also U.S. SENATE SELECT
COMM.

ON EQUAL

EDUCATIONAL

OP1ORTuNrTY,

TowARD

EQUAL

EDUCATIONAL

Opro-

116-18 (1974).
17. "In the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great
metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities-one white, the other black-but
it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 814-15 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
18. See text accompanying notes 113-15 infra. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974).
RTUNITr
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schools. 19 As a result of the general movement of middle-class whites
to suburbia, many urban school districts are already more than 50
percent black;20 thus, desegregating the urban districts alone will mean
that many of the schools will be predominantly black or have a high
percentage of black students, thereby precipitating white flight.2 ' The
result will not only be resegregation of those districts, but the whites
who do remain will be largely lower-income families unable to flee.
The situation has been succinctly described by one commentator as
follows:
The urban segregation problem which this approach [metropolitan
desegregation] is designed to remedy is the product of the massive
flight of white families from -the city to suburban communities located
outside of the territory covered by the city school district. Various
economic, political, social, and psychological factors combine to cause
this movement, not the least of which is the desire of whites to avoid
substantial racial integration in housing and in schools. Regardless
of the cause, the result of this movement is that the remaining city
public school population becomes predominantly black. When this
process has occurred, no amount of attendance zone revision, pairing
and clustering of schools and busing of students within the city school
district could achieve substantially integrated student bodies in the
schools, because there simply are not enough white students left in the
22
city system.
19. For a discussion of the relationship between the racial composition of the
schools and resulting housing choices, see Taeuber, Demographic Perspectives on Housing and School Segregation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 833, 842-43 (1975).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Although it has generally been assumed by courts and commentators that courtordered desegregation will accelerate the movement of middle-class whites from majority
or high percentage black schools in the urban district to the virtually all white schools in
the adjoining suburban districts, Professor Taeuber maintains that at this time the
assumption cannot be empirically demonstrated because "only a few large cities have
undertaken substantial desegregation of their schools, and much of this action has been
very recent." Taeuber, supra note 19, at 846. While this assertion may be correct, the
accelerated movement of whites from schools that have tipped black as a result of
changing population patterns makes it very reasonable to assume that this accelerated
movement would also occur whenever middle-class white students were assigned to
majority or high percentage black schools as a result of court-ordered desegregation.
22. Smedley, Developments in the Law of School Desegregation, 26 VAND. L. Rev.
405, 412 (1973). Thus, in Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a finding that the Atlanta school system, which had an 85 percent black
enrollment, was a unitary system, notwithstanding that 92 of its 148 schools had student
bodies that were over 90 percent black.
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It is as simple as that. Although this lack of white students will not
prevent court-ordered desegregation of an urban school district found to
be practicing de jure segregation, 8 the fact remains that an urban
school district desegregated in this manner will only be minimally
desegregated at best, and will probably not remain even minimally
desegregated for very long. For meaningful desegregation of our
urban school districts to occur, the desegregation in many cases will
need to be on a metropolitan basis, crossing the lines that now separate
the urban and suburban school districts.
Thus far we have been proceeding on the assumption that a legal
basis for ordering desegregation exists-that is, that the urban school
district is guilty of practicing de jure segregation.24 As a practical
matter, this legal basis will not generally be difficult to show. When the
urban school district is located in a state formerly requiring segregation
by law-the "southern situation"--it is clear from Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education25 that the failure to eliminate the
pattern of black and white schools by way of busing means that the
district is in constitutional violation.28 Most urban districts outside of
tie South will also now be found to have been pursuing a policy of
segregation, a policy designed in all probability to make the district's
schools more attractive to whites and to stem their movement to the
suburbs. In both the North and the South, such segregation is de jure
rather than de facto and therefore subjects the districts to the remedial
process of the courts. The dilemma then is not a difficulty in showing
the urban district to be in constitutional violation, but that any remedy
addressed to the urban district alone will often produce limited actual
desegregation, lead to white flight, and ultimately result in a resegregated district, blacker and poorer than before. Conversely, if metropolitan
desegregation were required, many of the country's metropolitan
23. The fear of white flight "cannot . .. be accepted as a reason for achieving
anything less than the complete uprooting of the dual public school system." United
States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972).
24. The Court has as yet been unwilling to abandon the de jure-de facto distinction,
although Justice Powell and former Justice Douglas, coming from different directions
and with different conclusions, have urged the Court to do so. See Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
25. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
26. See, e.g., Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 418 U.S. 918 (1974); Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1972).
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areas could be desegregated effectively.17 In the end, whether educational apartheid along urban-suburban lines will exist in the United
States will depend largely on whether or not metropolitan desegregation
occurs.
II.

METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION:

ThE LEGAL POSTURE AND SOCIETAL SETTING

A.

The Legal Posture

The legal posture in which the question of metropolitan desegregation
arises dates back to Brown v. Board of Education'8 and its underlying
premise of racial equality in education. Although the significance of
Brown went far beyond educational equality, 9 what may be called its
"educational rationale" stated that segregated education was inherently
unequal and harmful to black children and deprived them "of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system." 80
Since Brown arose as a challenge to school segregation required by state
law, the initial emphasis of subsequent school desegregation actions was
on the elimination of the dual school systems that existed in the southern and border states. The legal resistance to Brown and the tortuous
development of school desegregation law3 need not be reviewed here.
In 1968 in Green v. County School Board,32 the Court reached the
first "fork in the road" when it decided that meaningful desegregation
must actually occur. The Court took this step by effectively invalidating the "freedom of choice" plans, which had produced little actual
desegregation in the southern and border states,"' and by making it clear
27. There are certain areas such as New York City where the degree of racial

concentration is so great that any substantial amount of desegregation is made impossible. Similarly, as long as Washington, D.C. is maintained as a separate school district,
see Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972), its schools will remain
overwhelmingly black. But, as the Detroit situation demonstrates most clearly, it is
sometimes more practicable to achieve desegregation on a metropolitan basis than it is
within the urban district itself. See notes 161-62 infra and accompanying text.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. See generally Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RtrrGnPMs

L. REv.387, 423-34 (1967).
30. 347 U.S. at 494-95.
31. See generally Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation, Progress and Pros-

pects, 64 COLUM. L. Rv.193 (1964).
32. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
33.

See 1 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RiGHTS, RACAL ISOLATIoN IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

65-70 (1967).
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that the school board's duty was to "convert promptly to a system
without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools" that
would be attended by children of both races. 4 In the nonurban school
districts of the South, where the black and white populations were
generally dispersed and therefore geographic attendance zoning would
not create racially identifiable schools, the end of freedom of choice
plans35 virtually insured desegregation. This result was reinforced the
following year when the Court, in Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education,38 finally laid to rest the "all deliberate speed" formulation,
which had delayed full implementation of desegregation plans in many
southern and border districts.
The next "fork in the road" was reached in 1971 in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.17 As urban school districts outside the South had known all along, geographic attendance
zoning could build on patterns of residential racial segregation and
establish a system of substantially all-black and all-white schools, particularly at the elementary level. In Swann, the Court held that when
segregation had formerly been required by law, geographic attendance
zoning was insufficient to satisfy the school board's duty to convert to a
unitary system if the result of such zoning was a large number of racially
identifiable schools. The board would be required to desegregate these
schools by transporting the students between the black and the white
schools. Just as Green insured that the nonurban districts in the South
would be effectively desegregated, Swann insured that, to the extent
possible, meaningful desegregation would have to occur in the urban
districts as well. In the aftermath of Swann, a new round of desegregation litigation occurred in the South and resulted in the rather anomalous situation of there being substantially more actual desegregation in
the South, where segregation was formerly required by law, than in the
rest of the country, where segregation had not been required. 88
34. 391 U.S. at 442.
35. The same day that the Supreme Court decided Green, the Court also decided
two other cases in which it held freedom of choice plans to be insufficient. Monroe v.
Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443
(1968). In the wake of these cases, the lower courts invariably rejected freedom of
choice plans. See, e.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d
582 (5th Cir. 1969).
36. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
37. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. See generally U.S. SENATm SELECT COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTuNrr, supra note 16, at 102-05.
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Paralleling this development in the South was a no less significant
development elsewhere. The de jure-de facto distinction had allowed
school boards in districts in which segregation had not been required by

law to continue to operate factually segregated schools. 39 In the late
1960's, however, the courts began to scrutinize more carefully the actions of these school boards and came to recognize that the segregated
condition of the schools was not wholly accidental. 1 Quite to the con-

trary, in case after case the courts held that this condition was due to a
policy of segregation practiced by the boards. Consequently, the segregation was de jure rather than just de facto. 41 The courts emphasized
that the segregated character of the schools resulted from a series of
discretionary decisions made by the school boards over the years relat-

ing to school location and construction, closing of old schools and building of new ones, redrawing of boundary lines, transfer policies, and
similar matters and concluded that the decisions "more often than not
tended to perpetuate segregation. 42 Similarly, the school boards' attempts to justify those decisions in terms of supposedly neutral criteria
would usually require "inconsistent applications of these criteria. '43 As
44
the Sixth Circuit stated in Davis v. School District:
39. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); cf. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm.,
348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
40. One of the first cases illustrating this new recognition was Taylor v. Board of
Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). Earlier cases seemed
to require the plaintiffs to prove that the segregated condition of the schools was
"obviously deliberate." E.g., Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956) (school district lines gerrymandered). Typically, the
plaintiffs were not able to sustain their burden of showing discriminatory intent. See,
e.g., Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958); Sealy v. Department of Pub.
Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aif'd, 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Commrs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972); Davis
v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United
States v. School Dist. No. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Booker v. Special School
Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.,
311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
42. Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573, 576 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913
(1971).
43. Id.
44. 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
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Although . . . each decision considered alone might not compel the
conclusion that the Board of Education intended to foster segregation,
taken together, -they support the conclusion that a purposeful pattern
of racial discrimination has existed in the Pontiac school system for
45
at least 15 years.

In essence, the courts were holding that discretionary decisions having
the effect of producing a racially segregated school system were to be
equated with the intent to produce such a system, and thus the resulting
segregation was de jure rather than de facto.40
This development outside of the South reached a peak in 1973 when

Keyes v. School District Number One47 was decided. The Supreme
Court held that in a state in which racial segregation had never been
required by law, proof of segregative intent with respect to part of a
school system created a presumption that the segregated character of the
rest of the school system was also the result of this segregative intent.
The burden then shifted to the school board to rebut the presumption. 8
As a practical matter, this decision means that proof of a policy of
segregation in part of a system will have the effect of making the entire
system segregated, because, as Justice Powell observed,
there is . . . not a school district in the United States, with any significant minority school population, in which the school authorities-in
45. Id. at 576.

46. The Court has made it clear that whenever a claim of racial discrimination is
made, the primary emphasis must be on discriminatory effect rather than on discriminatory purpose. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461-63 (1972); cf.
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971). The school boards are held to be
aware of the "natural and foreseeable consequence[s]" of their actions. Hart v.
Community School Ed. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975). When the effect of
the actions is to produce a racially segregated school system, it is as much a do jure
segregated system as if segregation were required by state law. See id.
47. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
48. In this regard, the Court stated:
[Wie hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a
meaningful portion of a school system. .. creates a presumption that the other
segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in
other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of
school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that
other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. This is true even if it is determined that different
areas of the school district should be viewed independently of each other because, even in that situation, there is high probability that where school authorities have effectuated an intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion
of the school system, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their
actions in other areas of the system.
413 U.S. at 208.
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one way or another-have not contributed in some measure to the degree
of segregation which still prevails. 49
Although the Court in Keyes talked in terms of segregative intent, an

actual intent to discriminate need not be proved. The necessary intent
can be shown simply by examining a series of discretionary decisions

that have produced a condition of actual segregation. 50

When this

showing is made, at least with respect to part of the school system, the
school board will be found guilty of practicing de jure segregation
throughout the system and will be required, in the same manner as a

school district in which segregation was formerly required by law, to
dismantle the dual school system "root and branch." 51
With the decision in Keyes, school desegregation has clearly become a

national problem, 52 as has the question of metropolitan desegregation.
No longer is it difficult to prove that urban school districts, wherever
located, are in constitutional violation if they have a high degree of
racial segregation. In states in which segregation was formerly required
by law, segregation is found to be a vestige of state-imposed segregation

under Swann, and in other states segregation is found to result from
segregative intent under Keyes. If metropolitan desegregation were to

be required, it would certainly be required on a nationwide basis. This
49. Id. at 252-53.
50. As the Seventh Circuit has emphasized, "there are very few cases of school
segregation today in which the defendants admit that they had an improper intent. Such
intent may then be properly inferred from the objective actions." United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81, 88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973). See
generally Note, Segregative Intent and the Single Governmental Entity in School
Desegregation, 1973 DUE L.i. 1111, 1114-17.
51. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973). Because of this
development as well as the general unwillingness of courts to find any affirmative duty to
integrate, see cases cited and text accompanying note 39 supra, the duty to integrate
issue has lost its earlier significance. The issue was revived in the wake of Swann, at
least temporarily, by the plaintiffs in Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J.
1971), a]j'd mem., 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). The plaintiffs unsuccessfully contended that
Swann required a redistricting of school district lines to eliminate the racially-identifiable
black schools in a state in which segregation had not been required by law and in which
any de facto segregation was due solely to the geographical limitations of the municipal
boundaries, which were coextensive with the school district lines. At the same time,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that school district lines could be
disregarded by the Commissioner of Education in order to eliminate racial imbalance.
Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971).
52. Opposition to busing has become nationwide, as evidenced in most recent
election campaigns and in the enactment by Congress of anti-busing legislation, entitled,
oddly enough, the "Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974." 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 170158 (Supp. 1975).
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was the next "fork in the road," the one reached in Milliken v.
Bradley.53
B.

The Societal Setting

Before proceeding to a discussion of Milliken, this Article will
consider both the societal setting in which the question of metropolitan
desegregation arises and the implications, in terms of social class and
race, of the demand for actual desegregation. Some years ago, in
speaking of school desegregation, Professor Kaplan commented that "it
is unfortunate that what is essentially a class problem is being fought as
a racial one."5 The Supreme Court in Brown had proceeded upon the
educational rationale that racial segregation was harmful to black children because it deprived them "of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system."' 5 Professor Kaplan, however, argued that the generally poor academic performance of black
children is traceable not to their attendance at racially segregated
schools but rather to the entrapment of a large percentage of blacks
in the lower socio-economic class. As a result, segregated black
schools are predominantly lower socio-economic class schools.
According to Kaplan, "[f]he first and most obvious relation between
social class and the educational process is that, in general, the higher the
student's social class, the better he will do in school."' 0 The second,
and for our purposes more important, relation is that "the social class
composition of a given school has a powerful effect upon the education
of all the children in it."157 Because residential patterns are generally
socially as well as racially homogeneous, geographic attendance zoning
has the effect of producing social class isolation as well as, outside the
South, factually segregated schools. s Kaplan then reasoned:
Despite certain specifically racial problems, it seems that the problem
of de facto segregation is in the main a class problem .... The mere
racial integration of Negro children with lower class white children will
not be enough. What lower class Negro children need is integration
53. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). It is significant for these purposes that Milliken arose in
a northern state in which school segregation had never been required by state law.
54. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 214 (1963).
55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
56. Kaplan, supra note 54, at 196.
57. Id. at 197.

58. See id. at 208.
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with middle class children of any race. It is because there are simply not
enough middle class Negro children available that integration with middle class white children becomes important. This integration, however, is
exactly what is needed by the lower class white child, too. The problem of the lower class child, both Negro and white, is the real problem
of de facto segregation. 59
In this connection, it should be noted that the mere existence of separate
suburban school districts intensifies the social class, as well as the racial,
isolation of the urban district because lower socio-economic class whites
are generally unable to move to the suburbs.
Professor Kaplan's observations foreshadowed (and perhaps were
obscured by) the now famous Coleman Report,6 0 which found that the
most significant factor affecting student achievement was the social class
composition of the school. 6 ' With respect to the relation between social
class and racial integration, the Report concluded:
Thus the apparent beneficial effect of a student body with a high proportion of white students comes not from racial composition per se,
but from the better educational background and higher educational
aspirations that are, on the average, found among white students. The
effects of the student body environment upon a student's environment
appear to lie in the educational proficiency possessed by that student
62
body, whatever its racial or ethnic composition.
The following year the United States Commission on Civil Rights also
issued a report.13 Although the Commission endorsed the major findings of the Coleman Report, it contended that the racial characteristics
of fellow students did have an independent effect on the academic
performance of black children but that this factor was chiefly effective at
the classroom level rather than at the school level.6 4 Demonstrating this
independent effect was the finding that the average academic performance of disadvantaged blacks improved by two grade levels when disad59. Id. at 207.
60. J. COLEMAN, et al., EQUALrIY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1965) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN REPORT]. The study was undertaken by the United States Office of
Education in accordance with directives contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
61. The conclusions are effectively summarized in Goodman, De Facto School
Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALrF. L. REv. 275, 407-12
(1972).
62. COLEMAN REPORT 307, 310.
63. U.S. COMM'N ON Crvm RiGHTS, RACuL IsoLATON IN Tmu PUBLIC ScHooLs
(1967).
64. 1 id. at 81-82, 84-86.
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vantaged blacks were in a class with advantaged whites and by one full
grade level even when disadvantaged blacks were in a class with similar65
ly disadvantaged whites.
From the standpoint of blacks seeking improved educational opportunities for their children, the race-class question is neither legally nor
functionally significant. The Supreme Court has indicated no disposition either to depart from the educational rationale of Brown or to
suggest that racial segregation is not harmful to black children because
the problem is rooted in class rather than in race. Nor has the Court
been willing to assimilate discrimination on the basis of socio-economic
class to discrimination on the basis of race, 66 or even to hint that the
Constitution may prohibit different treatment for educational purposes
on the basis of social class membership.6 7 Legal attacks on the denial
of equal educational opportunity for black chidren must, therefore, still
be based on racial grounds. This race-class distinction does not have
even a real functional importance, however, since as Kaplan has cogently pointed out, there simply are not enough middle-class black children
available to achieve social class integration in predominantly black
schools. 68
In the context of desegregation litigation, lawyers for black plaintiffs
have learned to scrutinize desegregation plans and attempt to require,
whenever possible, that the plans achieve social class as well as racial
integration so that the former black schools do not become lower socioeconomic class schools. There is, however, little "legal clout" for
arguing that these ends must be incorporated in a plan.OD If within the
school district there is a substantial white population which is predominantly middle class in composition, full desegregation will mean that
65. Id. at 90-91.
66. See, e.g., James v. Vatierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
67. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
68. See text accompanying note 59 supra. The middle-class black child attending a
predominantly black school will be attending a school that is also of predominantly lower
socio-economic class composition. From an educational standpoint the child will be
disadvantaged.
69. Jefferson v. Board of Educ., a case in which I was counsel for the plaintiffs,
exemplifies this lack of legal clout. After the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining an order
directing the desegregation of the Fayette County (Lexington) schools, see 344 F. Supp.
688 (E.D. Ky. 1972), the school board proposed a plan which converted two former
black inner-city schools into schools having a 56 percent to 44 percent white-black ratio,
but which drew the whites almost entirely from lower-income areas. The two census
tracts included in the attendance zones had the lowest median income for both blacks
and whites in Fayette County. The court did not find this "legally" objectionable.
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black children, most of whom are lower socio-economic class, will be
attending schools in which middle-class whites form the majority. 70 By
the same token, when desegregation is limited to the urban district, very
often the schools that black children will be attending not only will be
predominantly black, but also will be lower socio-economic class in
composition because of the absence of middle-class whites.
I would submit that from the standpoint of middle-class whites, however, the intensive opposition to busing and, of course, to metropolitan
desegregation is founded much more on the basis of class than
on the basis of race.71 Surveys show, for example, that although twothirds of the American public approves of desegregated schools, over
two-thirds of the public opposes busing as a means of achieving desegregation. 72 Professor Derrick Bell contends that since meaningful desegregation in urban areas is obviously impossible without busing,
these seemingly contradictory findings reflect still another manifestation
of the traditional pattern of white America's racial behavior, expressed
in the formula of a public posture of democratic ideals combined with
actual racial policies that maintain blacks in a subordinate and op7
pressed status. 3
I would suggest, however, that approval of desegregated schools and
opposition to busing to achieve them is more an example of white
middle-class America's class behavior. Although today's white middleclass America has softened its racism to the extent that it recognizes the
existence of middle-class blacks7 4 and is willing to allow them to attend
70. Such attendance should have a positive effect on the academic performance of
the black children. See text accompanying note 65 supra. This does not mean,
however, that such improvement always occurs or that there are not additional barriers
to equality of educational opportunity for blacks even in desegregated schools. See Bell,
Integration: A No Win Policy for Blacks?, 11 INEQuALrrY rN EDUC&TION 35, 37, 40
(1972).

71. On the part of working-class and lower-class whites, the opposition to metropolitan desegregation is indeed racial in nature and is a clear illustration of how racism

divides working-class and lower-class whites from blacks, preventing these groups from
pursuing their common class interests. The "Boston situation" arose in the wake of a
desegregation plan that bused blacks into schools in South Boston, a predominantly
working-class and lower-class white area. See Kopkind, Banned in Boston: Busing into
Souihie, RAMPARPTs, Dec. 1974, at 34-38.
72. See Bell, supra note 70, at 35.
73. Id.
74. The term "middle-class black" covers a very wide income range and essentially
represents lifestyle values that are similar to those of middle-class whites. See generally
Drake, The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States, 94 DAEDALus
771, 779-84 (1965).
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"its schools," just as it is willing, somewhat more reluctantly and perhaps under the compulsion of open housing laws, to allow middle-class
blacks to live in "its neighborhoods,"'75 it is opposed to busing. Busing
would mean that all blacks, the great majority of whom are lower class,
would be included in school desegregation, and today's white middleclass America does not want its children to be forced to attend school
with lower-class blacks. But it does not want its children to be forced to
attend school with lower-class white children either. Rather, white
middle-class America wants its children to attend socially homogeneous
schools, 7 6 just as it wants them to live in socially homogeneous neighborhoods. And it knows that the hallowed neighborhood school system-for which it will go to the barricades-will produce these socially
homogeneous schools. Because desegregation by busing will destroy
the neighborhood school system and thus destroy the perceived class
advantage of having its children attend socially homogeneous schools,
white middle-class America, although "broadminded enough" to accept
racial desegregation, is vehemently opposed to busing.
I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough, for I believe that it
profoundly influences the societal setting within which the question of
metropolitan desegregation arises. The perceived class advantage derives from the belief of white middle-class parents that if their children
are required to attend school with lower-class children, black or white,
their children's academic performance will be pulled down.77 Because
most residential areas are socially as well as racially homogeneous, the
neighborhood school system affords to white middle-class children the
perceived class advantage resulting from attendance at socially homogeneous schools, regardless of the class composition of the student
population in the rest of the district. In addition, the neighborhood
school system enables a school board to allocate the district's educational
75. Since few middle-class blacks will actually live in these neighborhoods, there is
no longer any real fear that their presence will depress property values. As has long
been known, it is not blacks who depress property values but rather the attitudes of
middle-class whites toward blacks living in "their neighborhoods." Id. at 774. For
information on the income and urban-suburban distributions of the black population in
1972, see UNtiED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED
STATES 17, 382 (1974).
76. The social homogeneity in turn means that the schools will, for the most part, be
racially homogeneous as well.
77. This belief will only be true, of course, if the school is of predominantly lower
socio-economic class composition, but middle-class white parents believe that this result
will occur "across the board."
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resources in a manner favoring those schools attended by middle-class
white children. 78 By compelling middle-class white children to attend
school with lower-class black children,7 9 desegregation by busing completely destroys this perceived class advantage, and it is at this point,
when urban districts are compelled to desegregate or the neighborhood
school system is otherwise abandoned, that the process of white flight
occurs. s0

Because blacks and lower-class whites are not likely to reside in
suburbs, the perceived class advantage flowing from socially homogeneous schools is maximized by separate suburban school districts.81 In
addition, such districts may add to the perceived class advantage a
tangible benefit derived from the use of real estate taxes as the primary
method of local school financing and the expenditure of the tax monies
so raised exclusively in the local school district. Because of the high
value of the homes in suburbia, suburban school districts generally will
have more taxable wealth per student than urban districts. But even in
areas where this disparity does not exist, for example where an urban
district has a high tax base because of the presence of substantial
industrial and commercial properties, suburban district residents may be
willing to tax themselves at a higher rate, knowing that the money will
be spent for the education of their own children and not for the
education of lower-income children. In many respects, the socially
homogeneous suburban schools are not significantly unlike private
schools. It can thus be said that the suburban school districts are
operating "semi-private" schools for the benefit of the middle-class
whites who reside there.
Metropolitan desegregation, however, with the crossing of school
district lines between urban and suburban districts that it entails, would
destroy the perceived and often tangible class advantages of middle-class
78. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 436-38, 495-96 (D.D.C. 1967),
af 'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
79. Such compulsion would include white middle-class children's attendance at
generally older and tangibly inferior schools located in the inner city.
80. The matter of white flight is the basis for a "new Coleman Report," which
argues that "forced integration in large cities is reinforcing the racial isolation it was
meant to overcome." See Busing Backfired, National Observer, June 7, 1975, at 1, 18.
81. In this connection I am referring to what may be called the "typical" suburban
school district, which is predominantly middle-class white in composition. Particular
suburban school districts, of course, may be populated predominantly by working-class
whites, and in some suburban districts there may also be a substantial lower-income
white and/or black population.
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white children attending school in a socially homogeneous suburban
district. 8 Not only would these children be compelled to attend school
with lower-class blacks, but there would also necessarily be some sharing of the educational resources formerly reserved for the benefit of the
homogeneous middle-class white school districts. Metropolitan desegregation would also eliminate all but the last public school "escape
hatch" for middle-class whites, because parents could preserve social
homogeneity only by sending their children to private schools. 88
My point, therefore, is that the societal setting in which the question
of metropolitan desegregation arises is one of conflict between the
interest of middle-class whites in perpetuating a perceived class advantage obtained from attendance at socially homogeneous schools and the
interest of blacks, the great majority of whom are members of the lower
socio-economic class, in achieving the equality of educational opportunity that is reflected in attendance at racially and socially desegregated
schools. When viewed in these terms, the societal question before the
Court in Milliken was whether the perceived class advantage enjoyed by
middle-class whites residing in suburban school districts was to be taken
away to achieve racial integration for lower-class black children residing
in illegally segregated urban school districts.' To the extent that metropolitan desegregation was rejected in Milliken-and to the extent that it
cannot be achieved in Milliken's wake-the societal effect of the decision is the relegation of most black children to blacker and poorer
schools in the urban districts and the preservation of the perceived class
advantage enjoyed by middle-class whites. Certainly, without overstatement, Milliken presented a question of enormous societal importance
going to the essence of class advantage in public education. 4
82. Another challenge to what may be called the tangible class advantage reflected
in separate suburban school districts was the school financing litigation that came to a
head in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
theory of these cases was that under the equal protection clause the state could not rely
on local real estate taxes as a primary means of financing public education because of
the great disparity in taxable wealth existing between different districts. After the Court
in Rodriguez upheld the state practice, suburban school districts could continue to enjoy
the tangible class advantage that existed because of the greater wealth of their residents
(when this was the case). Moreover, the suburban districts would not be required to
share their educational resources with lower-class children who were not fortunate
enough to reside within their boundaries.
83. See notes 10, 12 supra.
84. Although the legal question of metropolitan desegregation is necessarily approached in terms of race, it must be recognized that the societal setting in which the
question arises is defined in terms of class.
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Milliken v. Bradley: ON LOSING BIG BATTLES

The Legal Build-Up

Although Milliken was the first occasion that the Court was forced to
consider "the validity of a remedy mandating cross-district or interdistrict consolidation to remedy a condition of segregation found to exist in
only one district," 85 there existed clear prior judicial experience in
disregarding school district lines to achieve effective desegregation and
in disregarding the significance of local governmental units in order to
implement federal constitutional rights. As the Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims,88 a voting district reapportionment case:
Political subdivisions of States--counties, cities or whatever-never
... have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather they have been
traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
87
functions.
Thus, upon finding that the state legislative districting schemes denied
citizens their constitutional right to "substantially equal state legislative
representation,"' 8s the Court in Reynolds required the voting districts to
be reapportioned on the basis of population without regard to the
boundaries of political subdivisions. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,8 9 the
Court found unconstitutional discrimination when the effect of redrawing municipal boundaries was the removal of virtually all black voters
from the city, preventing those voters from participating in municipal
elections. It was assumed by many persons that, at least in certain
situations, school district boundaries could be similarly disregarded to
achieve effective school desegregation.
One situation in which boundaries have been disregarded occurs
when separate black and white school districts, created in pre-Brown
days to facilitate state-imposed segregation, have remained separate after
Brown. For example, in Haney v. County Board of Education,90 a
1948 school district reorganization lumped three small black school
districts into a singie district and assigned the black children who lived
in the surrounding white school district to the schools in the new black
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

418 U.S. at 744.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 575.
Id. at 568.
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969).
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district. Thereafter, the property of the black families in the white
district was transferred for school purposes to the black district, which
resulted in that district "having noncontiguous and irregularly shaped
geographical areas." 91 In holding that county-wide desegregation was
required, the Eighth Circuit noted:
School district reorganization took place under the color of state law
that then required segregated schools. Under these circumstances, when
the resulting district lines drawn reflect a discriminatory pattern, de jure
92
segregation is established.

In Milliken the Court cited Haney approvingly to illustrate the situation
in which the state "contributed to separation of races by drawing of
93
school district lines."
Another case in which school district boundaries were disregarded
was United States v. Texas.9 Before 1954, the Texas school districts
were segregated by state law, and many school district lines were drawn
to create all-black or all-white districts. After 1954, consolidation of
small districts was encouraged, but school district officials could act to
merge with other districts, annex territory, or otherwise alter the district
boundaries only with the approval of the county boards of education.
The defendant county boards had consistently refused to consolidate the
all-black districts with contiguous all-white districts and by numerous
arrangements or acquiescences in boundary changes had acted to "create and perpetuate all-black districts." 95 In those districts with bi-racial
student populations, many of the schools became virtually all white or
all black as a result of a general pattern of voluntary interdistrict student
transfers approved by the county superintendents. Noting the responsibilities of the various defendant state, county, and school district officials for the continued segregated character of the all-black districts, the
court ordered the defendants to formulate a plan to desegregate completely the districts, disregarding the existing school district lines. In
Milliken the Supreme Court cited this case approvingly to illustrate the
situation of "one or more school districts created and maintained for one
9
race."
91. Id. at 922.
92. Id. at 924.
93. 418 U.S. at 744.
94. 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), affd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
95. Id. at 1048.
96. 418 U.S. at 744.
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In another series of cases, the lower federal courts enjoined the
creation of separate school districts when the resulting secession, although authorized by state law, would have had a "substantial adverse
effect on desegregation of the [existing] school district."'' g Two of
these cases, Wright v. Council of Emporia9 8 and United States v.
Scotland Neck City Board of Education,99 involving small rural districts,
reached the Supreme Court in 1972. All of the Justices agreed with the
basic approach of the lower courts, but disagreed among themselves
about its proper application in Wright.
The issue in Wright, as stated by Mr. Justice Stewart writing for the
majority, was in what circumstances "a federal court may enjoin state or
local officials from carving out a new school district from an existing
district that has not yet completed the process of dismantling a system of
enforced racial segregation."' 10 0 In Wright the racial composition of the
county school system, which was under a desegregation order, was 66
percent black and 34 percent white. If the city of Emporia had been
permitted to become a separate school district, it would have had a
racial composition of 52 percent black and 48 percent white, while the
racial composition of the county district would have been 72 percent
black and 28 percent white. 01 Although emphasizing that the test to
determine whether the separation was permissible was discriminatory
effect rather than discriminatory purpose, 10 the Court carefully avoided
a declaration that "this disparity in the racial composition of the two
systems would be a sufficient reason, standing alone, to enjoin the
creation of the separate school district."' 0 3 Nonetheless, the Court
noted:
Certainly, desegregation is not achieved by splitting a single school
system operating "white schools" and "Negro schools" into two new
systems, each operating unitary schools within its borders, where one of
97. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 1971); see
Stout v. United States, 448 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1971); Aytch v. Mitchell, 320 F. Supp.
1372 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Turner v. Warren County Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 380
(E.D.N.C. 1970); Burleson v. County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 308 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.
Ark.), afj'd mem., 432 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1970).
98. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
99. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
100. 407 U.S. at 453.
101. Id. at 464.
102. Id. at 461-62.
103. Id. at 464.
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the two new systems is, in fact, "white" and the other is, in fact,
"Negro."10 4

In holding that separation would not be permitted, the Court relied on
the findings of the district court that separation would increase the
percentage of blacks in the county school district and that Emporia's establishment of a separate system "would actually impede the process of
dismantling the dual school system."' 0 5 Chief Justice Burger, joined by
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, dissented on the ground that
after the separation both systems would be unitary and that the racial
disparity between the two districts following separation was not sufficient to deny Emporia the right that it had under state law to become a
separate entity. 10
In Scotland Neck the racial composition of the existing district, which
was in the process of being desegregated, was 78 percent black and 22
percent white. If the separate district had been created, it would have
been 43 percent black, while the remaining county district would have
been 89 percent black.' 07 The Court was unanimous in holding that
the separate districts could not be created. The Justices who had dissented in Wright felt constrained, however, to write a separate opinion.
They distinguished Scotland Neck from Wright on the grounds that (1)
if Scotland Neck were permitted to establish a separate district, most
of the black children residing in the county district would necessarily
be attending virtually all-black schools; (2) special legislation had to
be enacted by the state to enable Scotland Neck to establish a separate
school district; and (3) the district court had found that the severance
of Scotland Neck "was designed to minimize the number of [black]
children attending school with the white children residing in Scotland
Neck." 08
In Milliken, the Court cited Wright and Scotland Neck for the
proposition that a new school district could not be created from an
existing school district when the effect would be to impede the "process
of dismantling a dual school system."' 109 Although the majority and the
dissenters in Wright seemingly agreed on this proposition, differing only
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 463.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 471-75, 478-79 (dissenting opinion).
407 U.S. at 489-90.
Id. at 492.
418 U.S. at 744.
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on its application to the facts, Wright marked the first time that the
Court had sharply divided on the result in a school desegregation case.
This case may have had some portent for the future because the same
four Justices who dissented in Wright".0 two years later made up the
core of the majority in Milliken. Wright also provided a vehicle for the
dissenters to emphasize the importance of local autonomy in public
education 1 ' and to express concern that too much attention was being
paid to racial balance."12 In addition, for the first time the matter of
white flight was specifically discussed by the Court: by the Wright
majority in the context of white students leaving public schools when
the ratio of black students in the public schools increased and returning
when the ratio decreased,"' and by the Wright dissent in the context
of white families migrating to adjoining districts where there were
fewer blacks.1 4 The Court made it clear in Scotland Neck, however,
that a fear of white flight "cannot be accepted as a reason for achieving
anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school system,""' 5 a principle the Court reaffirmed in Milliken.
While Haney, United States v. Texas, Wright, and Scotland Neck all
sanctioned judicial disregard of local autonomy when necessary to
achieve effective desegregation, the first case squarely to raise before the
Supreme Court the question of crossing school district boundaries to
achieve metropolitan desegregation was Bradley v. School Board." 6 The
Court's four-to-four split, with Justice Powell not participating, indicated that metropolitan desegregation would not have "easy going" in the
Supreme Court. In the course of the Bradley litigation, the district
court had originally approved a desegregation plan for the Richmond,
Virginia, school district that would eliminate "the racial identifiability of
117
each facility to the extent feasible within the City of Richmond."'
110. Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger-the four
Justices appointed by former President Nixon.
111. 407 U.S. at 477-79 (dissenting opinion).
112. Id. at 473-74.

113. 407 U.S. at464.
114. The dissent noted in this regard: "Of course, when there are adjoining school
districts differing in their racial compositions, it is always conceivable that the differences will be accentuated by the so-called 'white flight' phenomenon." 407 U.S. at 475.
In Wright the dissent found the possibility to be remote because the entire area was
predominantly black.
115. 407 U.S. at491.
116. 412 U.S. 92 (1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th
Cir.), rev'd, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
117. 325 F. Supp. 828, 835 (E.D. Va. 1971).
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Because the Richmond school district was over 60 percent black at the
time of the litigation, the plan would have left most of the Richmond
schools heavily black.""
The district court then proposed a consolidation of the Richmond city
district with two adjoining county districts, each of which was over 90
percent white, to form a new district that would be about two-thirds
white."-9 Although the two adjoining districts had already achieved
unitary systems and although Richmond, under the city desegregation
plan previously approved by the district court, would also achieve a
unitary system, 20 the district court nevertheless held that it had the
power to order consolidation of the three districts. The court recognized that both the state officials and the Richmond school board were
responsible for the segregated condition of the Richmond schools, with
some active participation by the two adjoining districts.

21

Primarily,

however, the court proceeded on the premise that education was a state
responsibility and asserted that
[t]he State cannot escape its constitutional obligations by relinquishing
or delegating to local officials the authority to discriminate, nor can
it escape such obligations by dividing such power between them and
others of statewide authority.' 22
The Fourth Circuit reversed, 23 emphasizing:
(1) the boundaries of the city and the two counties had not been originally established or subsequently maintained for the purpose of perpetuating racial segregation in the schools, and (2) each of the three
governmental units, acting either under court orders or [otherwise],
had eliminated the racially dual school system within the confines of
its own territory to the extent that this result feasibly could be at24
tained.
118. During the 1971-1972 school year when the plan first went into effect, four of
the seven high schools were 70 percent or more black, and all but one high school were
majority black; five of the nine middle schools were more than 70 percent black, and all
but two middle schools were majority black; and 17 of the 40 elementary schools were
more than 70 percent black, and all but four elementary schools were majority black,
338 F. Supp. 67, 240-42 (E.D. Va. 1972).
119. Id. at 184-85. For the order and the data on which it was based, see id. at 23148.
120. 462 F.2d 1058, 1061, 1070 (4th Cir. 1972).
121. 338 F. Supp. 67, 167-68 (E.D. Va. 1972).
122. Id. at 102.
123. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
124. Smedley, supra note 22, at 414 (summarizing the Fourth Circuit's holding).
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The court of appeals also concluded that while the discriminatory
actions of county officials may have restricted access of blacks to the
counties,
what little action, if any, the counties may seem to have taken to keep
blacks out is slight indeed compared to the myriad reasons, economic,
political and social, for the concentration of blacks in Richmond and
does not support the conclusion that it has been invidious state action
which has resulted in the racial composition of the three school
125
districts.
Because the Fourth Circuit's approach in Bradley was not significantly
different from that of the Supreme Court majority in Milliken, it is not
fruitful to dwell on the opinion at length, particularly since all of the
school districts involved in Bradley were unitary systems 126 while the
127
urban district involved in Milliken was not.
The final step in the legal build-up to Milhiken was San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,12 8 and in retrospect, I believe
that it foreshadowed the result in Milliken. The Justices lined up in
Rodriguez just as they later did in Milliken, Justice Stewart casting the
swing vote in both cases.' 29 Apart from the Court's holding that
education was not a "fundamental right" and that no readily definable
class was victimized by the alleged discrimination, 3 0 the essential point
of Rodriguez was the need for local autonomy in public education, a
concept that clearly carried over into Milliken. In this regard the Court
stated:
While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it [the
Texas system of school finance] permits and encourages a large measure
of participation in and control of each district's schools at the local
level. In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for
public education has survived ....
125. 462 F.2d at 1066.
126. The Richmond system became a unitary one during the 1971-1972 school year
when the "Richmond only" plan was put into effect.
127. Because the Detroit school system was in constitutional violation and metropolitan desegregation would be designed to remedy that violation, Milliken presented a
stronger case for metropolitan desegregation than did Bradley.
128. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
129. In both cases, Justice Stewart wrote short concurring opinions seeking to limit
the scope of the decisions.

130. Neither of these points would carry over into Milliken as such, since blacks have
a "fundamental right" to be free from government-imposed discrimination.
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The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level
where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of its
supporters. In part, local controls means, as Professor Coleman suggests,
the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children., 1
Equally important, however, is the opportunity it offers for participation
in the decisionmaking process that determines how those local tax
dollars will be spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.
... No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public
1 32
education.
The effect of Rodriguez and its emphasis on local autonomy was clearly
to protect the tangible class interest of middle-class suburban whites in
using their tax monies for the education of their own children in what
were racially and socially homogeneous schools. In Milliken the class
advantage reflected in the attendance of middle-class white children at
such schools was threatened even more significantly. If metropolitan
desegregation were ordered "across the board," not only would the
suburban white children have to share their educational advantages with
lower-class black children, but they would also have to attend the same
schools. In the context of public education today, local autonomy has
become synonymous with class interest, and the same deference that the
majority gave to local autonomy in Rodriguez, as might have been
expected, appeared again in Milliken.
B.

The Milliken Decision: On Losing Big Battles

The essential theory of metropolitan desegregation advanced by the
plaintiffs and accepted by the district and circuit courts in Milliken was
that the federal courts could impose an interdistrict remedy when: the
urban district was in constitutional violation; the actions of the state
contributed to this violation; and the state had the primary responsibility
for public education and could exercise significant control over the local
school districts. 8s The necessity for such a remedy was premised on
131. As noted above, this "freedom" is what Rodriguez was all about. Even if the
suburban districts did not have greater taxable wealth per pupil than the adjoining urban
district, their residents could vote higher taxes, knowing that the taxes would not be used
for the education of blacks and lower-income whites. See text following note 81 supra.
132. 411 U.S. at 49-50.
133. See generally Comment, Consolidation and Desegregation: The Unresolved
Issue of the Inevitable Sequel, 82 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687-94 (1973).
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the district court's finding that a remedy limited to the urban district
alone would be inadequate to achieve meaningful and lasting desegregation. This finding was clearly supported by the record in Milliken and
was not questioned by either the Sixth Circuit 3 4 or the Supreme
Court.18 5 Rather, the major question was whether the district court had
the power to impose an interdistrict remedy in this case, the answer
depending on judicial acceptance of the plaintiffs' theory of metropolitan desegregation. The Sixth Circuit accepted this theory and stated its
rationale clearly and succinctly:
Thus, the record establishes that the State has committed de jure
acts of segregation and that the State controls the instrumentalities
whose action is necessary to remedy the harmful effects of the State
acts. There can be little doubt that a federal court has both the power
and the duty to effect a feasible desegregation plan.... In the instant
case the only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the
boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or
nearby school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective
desegregation plan. The power to disregard such artificial barriers is
all the more clear where, as here, the State has been guilty of discrimination which had the effect of creating and maintaining racial segregation along school district lines ...
We reject the contention that school district lines are sacrosanct and
that the jurisdiction of the District Court to grant equitable relief in
the present case is limited to the geographical boundaries of Detroit.
We reiterate that school districts and school boards are instrumentalities
136
of the State.
If this theory of metropolitan desegregation had been accepted by the
Supreme Court, an interdistrict remedy would have become as conventional in urban desegregation cases as the interschool busing remedy
ordered in Swann, for presumably a district court would often find that
effective desegregation could not be achieved within the boundaries of
the urban district alone. Milliken, like Swann, would have given rise to
a new round of litigation, this time seeking broad metropolitan desegre134. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 242-45, 250 (6th Cir. 1973).
135. 418 U.S. at 766-67 (White, J., dissenting).
136. 484 F.2d at 249-50. The court also noted that in Brown v. Board of Educ. (II),
349 U.S, 294, 300-01 (1955), the Court referred to "revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the
public schools on a nonracial basis." 484 F.2d at 250. For the Sixth Circuit's efforts to
distinguish Bradley v. School Bd., see id. at 250-51.

564

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 1975:535

gation of many of the urban areas in this country. This future, however, was not to be.
The Supreme Court, splitting essentially on a four-one-four basis, 8 7
rejected this metropolitan desegregation theory, reversed the judgment
88
of the Sixth Circuit, and remanded the case for a "Detroit only" plan.1
Although noting the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that metropolitan desegregation was appropriate in Detroit "because of the State's violations, and
[that it] could be implemented because of the State's authority to
control local school districts,"'8 9 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, 140 found the reasoning wanting. First, there was the problem
of local autonomy. The Sixth Circuit had begun its analysis with the
"conclusion that school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines on
a map drawn 'for politcal convenience,' ,,141 a premise with which the
Supreme Court sharply disagreed.
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional
violation calling for interdistrict relief, but -the notion that school dis•trict lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than
local control over the operation of schools ....142
The Court then discussed the provisions for local autonomy in Michigan
law, observing that the metropolitan remedy ordered by the district
court "would require, in effect, consolidation of 54 independent school
districts historically administered as separate units into a vast new super
school district.' 43 Major administrative problems would result from
such a consolidation, and
absent a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to
school districts the District Court [would] become first, a de facto
137. Although Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurring opinion, he also joined in
the opinion of the Court.
138. 418 U.S. at 752-53.
139. id. at 735.
140. See note 137 supra.
141. 418 U.S. at 741.
142. Id. The Court cited San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50
(1973), for the proposition that
local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to
participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to
fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence."
418 U.S. at 742.
143. 418 U.S. at 743.
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"legislative authority" to resolve these complex questions, and then the
44
"school superintendent" for the entire area.

This did not mean, however, that school district lines could not be
bridged for desegregation purposes. As will be emphasized throughout
the remainder of this Article, the Court expressly held that school
district lines could be bridged "where there has been a constitutional
1 stating: "School district lines
violation calling for interdistrict relief,"' 45
and the present laws with respect to local control, are not sacrosanct and
if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a
duty to prescribe appropriate remedies."'146 The problem, however, was
to determine what constituted a "constitutional violation calling for
interdistrict relief." In the Milliken situation in which only one district
was found to be in constitutional violation, the majority was unwilling to
premise an interdistrict remedy either on that violation, even if the state
had contributed to it, or on the state's responsibility for public education
and its control over local school districts. Something more was required:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may
be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or
by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there
has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a
significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must
be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school
districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of
interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in
order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district
lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race .... Conversely,
without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no
14 7
constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.
Since the evidence in Milliken was limited to violations occurring in the
Detroit school district, and there was no showing of any signficant
144. Id. at 743-44.
145. Id. at 741.
146. Id. at 744, citing United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484
(1972), Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), Haney v. County Bd. of
Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969), United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, aff'd,
447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); see text accompanying notes 90-109 supra.
147. 418 U.S. at 744-45.
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violation by any of the outlying districts, 148 the majority believed that
approving an interdistrict remedy "would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a
wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in.
'149
any holding of this Court.
The majority emphasized that any acts of racial discrimination committed by the state of Michigan were limited to causing segregation
within the Detroit district alone."
Taking the position that the "right"
of black children to attend a unitary system was limited to the system in
which the constitutional violation occurred, the majority reasoned that
because the record showed only that "[d]isparate treatment of white
and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system. . . the
remedy must be limited to that system." ' 1 In relating the entitlement
to an interdistrict remedy to the constitutional right of black children
to attend desegregated schools, the Court continued:
The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit
is to attend a unitary school system in that district. Unless petitioners
drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or arranged for white
students residing in the Detroit district to attend schools in Oakland
and Macomb Counties, they were under no constitutional duty to make
provisions for Negro students to do so. The view of the dissenters,
that the existence of a dual system in Detroit can be made -the basis
for a decree requiring cross-district transportation of pupils cannot
be supported on the grounds that it represents merely the devising of
a suitably flexible remedy for the violation of rights already established
148. It was shown that in the late 1950's, the predominantly black Carver District
contracted to have its black high school students sent to a predominantly black high
school in Detroit, since it did not have a high school of its own. In 1960, Carver was
annexed by the predominantly white Oak Park School District and this arrangement
ceased. The Court held that even if the contractual arrangement could justify the
assumption that the Carver blacks were sent to Detroit because adjoining white districts
would not accept them,
this isolated instance affecting two of the school districts would not justify the
broad metropolitanwide remedy contemplated by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals, particularly since it embraced potentially 52
districts having no responsibility for the arrangement and involved 503,000
pupils in addition to Detroit's 276,000 students.
418 U.S. at 750.
149. Id. at 745.
150. See id. at 748-52.
151. Id. at 746.
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by our prior decisions. It can be supported only by drastic expansion
without any support in
of the constitutional right itself, an expansion
152
either constitutional principle or precedent.
Justice Stewart, who cast the decisive fifth vote rejecting the plaintiffs'
theory of metropolitan desegregation, felt constrained, "in view of some
of the extravagant language of the dissenting opinions,"'1 3 to write a
concurrence stating his understanding of what the Court had decided.
First he emphasized that no "questions of substantive constitutional
law" were presented to the Supreme Court; the issue involved, "rather,
the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction."' 5 4 Imposing an
interdistrict remedy was improper because the remedy "was not commensurate with the constitutional violation found"' 5 and "would go
beyond the boundaries of the district where the constitutional violation
was found, and include schools. . . in many other school districts that
have presumptively been administered in complete accord with the
Constitution."'158 Nevertheless, echoing the Court opinion Justice Stewart explicitly reaffirmed the power and perhaps the duty of the federal
courts to impose an interdistrict remedy in a proper case. Justice
Stewart focused on the responsibility of the state for interdistrict school
segregation-for example, when "state officials had contributed to the
separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines," or
(Justice Stewart here added a new possibility) had contributed "by
purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning
laws." 15 7 No interdistrict violation had been shown, however, and
the mere fact of different racial compositions in contiguous districts
does not itself imply or constitute a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause in the absence of a showing that such disparity was imposed,
fostered, or encouraged by the State or its political subdivisions .... 1r8
Finding no interdistrict violation, Justice Stewart concluded:
By approving a remedy that would reach beyond the limits . . . of
Detroit to correct a constitutional violation found to have occurred
solely within that city the Court of Appeals thus went beyond the governing equitable principles established in this Court's decisions. 1 59
152. Id. at 746-47 (footnote omitted).
153. Id. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 757.
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For Justice Stewart, as long as one district was in violation and there was
no interdistrict violation, an interdistrict remedy could not be imposed,
notwithstanding the state's overall responsibility for public education
and its control over local school districts.
Justices Douglas, 60 White, and Marshall each filed dissenting opinions, with Justices Douglas and Brennan joining in the White and

Marshall dissents and Justices White and Marshall each joining in the
dissent of the other. The dissenters essentially agreed with the theory of
metropolitan desegregation asserted by the plaintiffs and accepted by the

district court and court of appeals, but they made some important additional points. First, there was the matter of practicability. Although the
majority was concerned with the practical problems of administering an
interdistrict remedy, 6" there was no suggestion that metropolitan desegregation was impracticable in the Detroit area in the sense that too many
students would have to be transported for excessive distances. Quite to

the contrary, as Justice White pointed out, the majority left "unchallenged the District Court's conclusion that a plan including the suburbs
would be physically easier and more practical and feasible than a
Detroit-only plan."'16 2

Second, the dissenters emphasized that metropolitan desegregation
was necessary to remedy effectively the segregation existing within the
160. Justice Douglas noted that the effect of Milliken and Rodriguez, taken together,
was "that there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause though the schools are
segregated by race and though the black schools are not only 'separate' but 'inferior.'"
418 U.S. at 761.
161. Such practical problems would be present whenever an interdistrict remedy is
ordered, however, and the Court has clearly recognized that an interdistrict remedy can
be imposed in certain circumstances. For a discussion of how to deal with these
problems, see Hain, Techniques of Governmental Reorganization to Achieve School
Desegregation,21 WAYNE L. Rae. 779 (1975).
162. 418 U.S. at 767 (White, J., dissenting). The most promising "Detroit-only" plan
before the Court would have left many schools 75 to 90 percent black, involved busing
82,000 students, and required the purchase of 900 new buses. Although the metropolitan
plan would have involved the busing of a total of 310,000 students in the metropolitan
area, about 300,000 students were already riding to school on some type of bus so that
only 350 new buses would have been required to implement the metropolitan plan. Id. at
767, 800, 813 (White & Marshall, JI., dissenting). Moreover, 17 of the districts
included in the metropolitan plan were contiguous to the Detroit district, and the
remainder were no more than eight miles outside Detroit's city limits; the maximum oneway travel time by bus under the plan was 40 minutes. Id. at 813 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In Swann the Court noted that the one-way bus trips for elementary school
students would "take not over 35 minutes at the most." 402 U.S. at 30. For a summary
of the plan adopted by the district court on remand, see note 172 infra.
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Detroit school district because a "Detroit-only" plan would not remedy

the constitutional violation. Justice Marshall chided the majority for
ignoring both the district court's "explicit finding that a Detroit-only
decree . . . 'would not accomplish desegregation,' "163 and the district
court's belief that "interdistrict relief was .
a necessary part of any
meaningful effort by the State of Michigan to remedy the state-caused
segregation within the city of Detroit. ' 1 4 Justice Marshall himself
concluded that a Detroit-only plan was hopeless:
Because of the already high and rapidly increasing percentage of
Negro students in the Detroit system, as well as the prospect of white
flight, a Detroit-only plan simply has no hope of achieving actual desegregation. Under such a plan white and Negro students will not go
to school together. Instead, Negro children will continue to attend allNegro schools. The very evil that Brown I was aimed at will not be
cured, but will be perpetuated for the future. 1 5
Third, the dissenters insisted that the need for metropolitan desegregation was not premised on any notion of racial balance, as the majority
had intimated, 6 6 but rather on the realization that only by metropolitan
desegregation would it be possible to eliminate the large number of
racially identifiable schools within the Detroit school district. In Justice Marshall's words:
The flaw of a Detroit-only decree is not that it does not reach some
ideal degree of racial balance or mixing. It simply does not promise
to achieve actual desegregation at all. It is one thing to have a system
where a small number of students remain in racially identifiable schools.
It is something else entirely to have a system where all students continue to attend such schools. 167
Finally, the dissenters' crucial point of difference with the majority
was over the matter of showing an interdistrict violation. Although the
163. 418 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 789.
165. Id. at 802.
166. 418 U.S. at 739-41 (majority opinion).
167. 418 U.S. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The racially identifiable character of
the black schools in Detroit was intensified for Justice Marshall because "Iflor these
purposes the city of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs must be viewed as a single
community." Id. at 804. Justice Marshall continued:
It will be of scant significance to Negro children who have for years been
confined by de jure acts of segregation to a growing core of all-Negro schools
surrounded by a ring of all-white schools that the new dividing line between
the races is the school district boundary.

Id. at 805.
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dissenters attempted to show some connection between the state's segregatory acts bearing upon the Detroit school system and the resulting
racial disparity between the Detroit and suburban school districts, 1 8 the
dissenters' basic position was that, "[g]iven the State's broad powers
over local school districts, it was well within the State's powers to require
those districts surrounding the Detroit school district to participate in a
metropolitan remedy."'.6 9 In response to the majority's requirement of
an interdistrict violation, Justice White stated:
The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and
their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be
infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing
school desegregation cases, but because an effective remedy would
cause what the Court considers to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of Michigan, the entity
at which the Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies
by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local school
districts. If this is the case in Michigan, it will be the case in most
States.lro
The sharpness of the division among the Court, as well as the significant
societal implications of the decision, is reflected in the closing words of
Justice Marshall's dissent:
Desegregation is not and never was expected to be an easy task....
But just as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to stand in
the way of the rights of others, so public opposition, no matter how
strident, cannot be permitted to divert this Court from the enforcement
of the constitutional principles at issue in this case. Today's holding, I
fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we have gone
far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice
than it is the product of neutral principles of law. In the short run,
it may seem to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas
to be divided up each into two cities-one white, the other blackbut it is a course, I predict, our people will ultimately regret. I dissent.17'
The Court had come to another "fork in the road," but for the first time
168. Id. at 805-06.
169. Id. at 807.

170. 418 U.S. at 763 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also noted that provisions
for community participation could be included in the interdistrict desegregation plan. Id.
at 778-79.
171. 418 U.S. at 814-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Vol. 1975:535]

METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION

it chose the road that led away from desegregation and away from equal

educational opportunities for black children. In the wake of Milliken,
interdistrict relief and metropolitan desegregation would not become the
conventional remedy for eliminating state-imposed segregation in urban
school districts. A big battle had indeed been lost.172
C.

The Meaning of Milliken: Where Do We Go from Here?
In the wake of Milliken, the proponents of metropolitan desegrega-

tion have had to "pick up the pieces"'173 and ask, 'Where do we go from

here?" The starting point in formulating new strategies, of course, is to
determine just what it was that the Court decided in Milliken. It is not

necessary to embark upon the game of doctrinal anaylsis, looking for
significance in each judicial utterance and trying to find the "legal

rationale" for imposing interdistrict relief that the Court purportedly
propounded in Milliken. What is necessary, though, is to focus on the
majority's approach to the problem of metropolitan desegregation and to

the imposition of an interdistrict remedy and then determine from that
172. For the memorandum opinion and remedial decree of the district court on
remand, see Bradley v. Milliken, Civil No. 35257 (E.D. Mich., Aug. 15, 1975). On
remand, the district court rejected the plans of both the plaintiffs and the Detroit Board
of Education because they involved too much busing and were too rigidly structured
according to racial percentages. Instead, the court ordered the Detroit board to draw up
a considerably more limited busing program within the guidelines provided by the court.
Finding that it was "impossible to avoid having a substantial number of all black or
nearly all black schools in a school district" over 70 percent black and that any remedy
"must prevent resegregation at all costs," the court adopted guidelines that considered the
"'practicalities of the situation' and at the same time [made] 'every effort to achieve the
greatest possible degree of actual desegregation."' Id., quoting Davis v. School
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). Under the plaintiffs' plan every school would have
been racially identifiable as black because each school would reflect the racial composition of the Detroit school system. The court, however, held that if the white identifiable
schools were eliminated, the Detroit schools would be sufficiently desegregated. Under
the court's definition of "desegregated," any school 30 to 55 percent black would be
considered desegregated, but no school would be permitted to remain more than 70
percent white. Neither black nor white children were to be bused to any school already
desegregated under the court's definition, and busing was in all events to be minimized.
Notably, the court suggested that the Detroit board consider the "Weighted Poverty
Index" of each school when pairing schools for desegregation. "The socioeconomic mix,
as measured by the poverty index, is a significant factor and should be considered along
with the racial mix." Id. n.13. The court also ordered the development of a massive
educational program to improve the quality of the Detroit schools.
173. My use of this term is doubtless a projection of my own feelings when I was
informed of the Milliken decision and the concomitant remand of the LouisvilleJefferson County litigation.
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approach the majority's likely institutional behavior174 in future cases.
This analysis must also take into account the sharp split within the
Court on the issue of metropolitan desegregation and the pivotal position occupied by Justice Stewart on this issue.17 5 Finally, from the
standpoint of the litigating lawyer, consideration must be given to the
manner in which lower federal court judges will "read" the decision in
Milliken since they will be the first ones presented with the question,
"What did the Court decide in Milliken?"
Academic commentators, whether approaching the matter in terms of
doctrinal analysis or result orientation, tend to read Supreme Court
opinions broadly, particularly in landmark cases. In a case such as
Milliken they would be looking for the "test" to be used in determining
whether federal courts have the power to issue desegregation orders that
cross school district lines. These academicians would assume that this
"test" would be applied to the facts of particular cases by lower federal
courts and, should the question come before it again, by the Supreme
Court. Approaching Milliken in this way, we would probably be
correct to state that the majority's test is whether "there has been a
constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief," 176 and that this
question is answered affirmatively when there has been "an interdistrict
violation and interdistrict effect."' 177 An example of such a violation
would be a case in which there has been proof that school district lines
have been drawn in a racially discriminatory manner or that other
discriminatory acts of state officials or of one or more school districts
have substantially caused interdistrict segregation. 78 Using that test
alone, a commentator focusing upon the result might conclude, not
unreasonably,
174. I continue to believe, as Justice Holmes observed so long ago, that lav is no
more than "prophecies of what the courts will do in fact." Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. RBv. 457, 461 (1897).
175. As Justice Clark, sitting by designation, observed in Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 962
(1975): "Justice Stewart's view is pivotal because his vote makes a majority when added
to any of the other opinions. It is also significant that the Chief Justice's opinion does
not indicate any disagreement with Justice Stewart's understanding." The recent resignation of Justice Douglas and his replacement by Justice Stevens will, of course, affect this
analysis, which was based on an assumed constancy in Court personnel.
176. 418 U.S. at 741.
177. Id. at 745.
178. See id. at 744-45.
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[albsent a near-impossible showing that various school districts have
conspired to keep black children isolated in one of ,them or that the
state has so operated, the state interest in local control over education
will impose an outer limit on a federal court's power to order desegregation. 17 9
I would submit that it is not proper to read Milliken in this way,

either from the standpoint of conventional doctrinal analysis or, more
ignificantly, from the standpoint of result orientation. 80 The Court in
Milliken was faced with the question of when there could be a remedy

"mandating cross-district or interdistrict consolidation to remedy a condition of segregation found to exist in only one district."' 1 The Sixth
Circuit had accepted a particular theory to justify imposing an interdistrict remedy in that situation. Under strict stare decisis, what the Court
held was only that an interdistrict remedy could not be imposed in the
factual situation presented and on the theory of metropolitan desegregation accepted by the Sixth Circuit; anything that the Court said about

the broader circumstances in which an interdistrict remedy might be
appropriate was, strictly speaking, dicta.' 82
But, of course, it is unrealistic to treat Supreme Court decisions,

particularly those in "landmark" cases, in terms of doctrinal analysis.
What is important is the Court's approach in Milliken to the problem of

metropolitan desegregation and the imposition of an interdistrict remedy. That approach was, on the one hand, to reject the theory of
metropolitan desegregation that had been advanced by the plaintiffs
179. Dell'Ario, supra note 2, at 149.
180. There has been some question about whether the decision in Milliken represented constitutional doctrine rather than, as was explicitly stated by Justice Stewart, 418
U.S. at 753, "the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction." See Comment,
aupra note 2. Relying on Justice Stewart's concurrence, the courts have viewed the
decision as being based on "remedies considerations." See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 935-36 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 962
(1975); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 431-32 (D. Del.), aff'd mem., 96 S. Ct.
381 (1975). Since the functional question, however, is whether school district lines may
be crossed to remedy de jure segregation, I cannot see how the result would differ
depending on whether Milliken is viewed as setting constitutional or remedies limitations
on the power of the federal courts.
181. 418 U.S. at 744.
182. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, Justice Clark, writing for the
majority attempted to fit Milliken "into an established line of precedent," and noted that
"any application of the opinion to factual situations other than the one before the Court
would be dictum." Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.2d 930, 935-36 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
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and, on the other hand, to affirm explicitly the power of federal courts
to impose interdistrict remedies in appropriate circumstances, which
might be ascertained by some guidelines furnished by the
Court. The
focal point for the majority was a "constitutional violation calling for
interdistrict relief,"'" 3 which, in the view of five members of the Court,
was not to be found merely because the state contributed to the constitutional violation existing within the urban district or because the state had
overall responsibility for education and substantial control over local
school districts.
The guidelines' importance is not that they constitute an inflexible
rule or that they furnish the only means by which it is possible to show a
"constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief," but rather that
they indicate the circumstances in which the Court will find such relief
to be clearly appropriate. For example, the guideline governing cases
in which school district lines have been drawn in a racially discriminatory manner, buttressed by the citation to Haney and United States v.
Texas,18 is very specific. As the following discussion will indicate, this
guideline can be used not only when the lines were drawn on a racial
basis to conform to pre-Brown, state-required segregation, but also
when the result of recent school consolidation or reorganization has
been the creation of a predominantly or disproportionately black district
surrounded by predominantly white districts."8 5
In contrast to the specificity of the first guideline, the second guideline, governing cases in which other discriminatory acts of state officials
or one or more school districts have substantially caused interdistrict
segregation,"8 ' is phrased very broadly. This guideline can be interpreted to cover a number of situations, including those in which the acts of
the suburban district helped perpetuate segregation in the urban district,12 the particular state law relating to school district boundaries
impedes desegregation efforts in the urban district, 88 or state laws
relating to school district consolidation or metropolitan government have
contributed to the maintenance of a predominantly black urban school
district. 18 9 The very breadth of the guideline indicates that the Milliken
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

418 U.S. at 741.
Id. at 744; see id. at 745; 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See text accompanying notes 200, 296-303 infra.
See 418 U.S. at 745.
See text accompanying notes 271-72 inIra.
See text preceding and accompanying notes 257-61 infra.
See text accompanying notes 314-39 infra.
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majority was keeping open its options on the question of what constitutes a "constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief." For
example, another possibility suggested by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion is the situation in which the state has "contributed to the
separation of the races.

. .

by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of

state housing or zoning laws."' 90
Because the majority's approach was based on a rejection of the Sixth
Circuit's "state responsibility" rationale, I would submit that the majority, or at least Justice Stewart, still might permit metropolitan desegregation if, for instance, the other districts included in the metropolitan plan
were themselves in constitutional violation or if there had been an
historic and continuing relationship between the districts included in the
plan, even though there was no interdistrict segregatory effect. Since
the Court recognized a power in the federal courts to impose interdistrict
relief in appropriate cases and rejected only the theory of metropolitan
desegregation advanced in Milliken, I think it is clearly unsound to read
the case broadly as a sweeping rejection of metropolitan desegregation
and the interdistrict remedy. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion
seemed to agree. 191
What then is the "behavioral message" of Milliken? What was the
Court majority really saying about metropolitan desegregation? Although behavioral analysis in this area is highly speculative, 9 ' I nevertheless believe that in terms of the result and articulated rationale, the
majority was warning that metropolitan desegregation will not be an
easy remedy to obtain and that it will not be the conventional remedy for
segregation in urban school districts. At the same time, the majority
expressly recognized that imposing such a remedy is appropriate in
certain circumstances. I strongly disagree with the assertion, referred to
above, that
[a]bsent a near-impossible showing -that various school districts have
conspired to keep black children isolated in one of them or that the
190. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring). The three-judge court in Evans v.
Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd mem., 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975), expressly
relied on this ground, as did the district court in United States v. Board of School
Comm'rs, Civil No. 68-225 (S.D. Ind., Aug. 1, 1975) (memorandum of decision). See
text accompanying notes 332-35, 344-51 infra.
191. The majority opinion did not indicate any disagreement with Justice Stewart's
understanding of the holding. See note 175 supra.
192. Such an analysis is also obviously influenced by my "adversary perspective."
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state has so operated, 93 the state interest in local control over education
will impose an outer limit on a federal court's power to order desegre194
gation.
And I think it is utterly absurd to conclude that, "[for the majority at
least, Detroit should be the end of the line in school desegregation
cases."' 19 5 Quite to the contrary, I think that Milliken must be seen as
the starting point for a new round of litigation based on an entirely
different approach, an approach that looks to the interdistrict circumstances prevailing in particular metropolitan areas and sets forth a
justification for imposing an interdistrict remedy in that case.
Looking at Milliken and the rationales articulated there, we see not
only a Court badly split on the question of metropolitan desegregationa question with strong class implications clashing with the Coures
previously articulated commitments to racial equality, and to equality of
educational opportunities for black children-but also a Court majority
ambivalent, rather than hostile, toward metropolitan desegregation. Because of this ambivalence, five members of the Court are saying, with
perhaps Justice Stewart being a bit more encouraging:
Go slow, proceed on a case-by-case basis rather than "across the board,"
and in a proper case we will approve -theimposition of an interdistrict
remedy and perhaps give more guidance about the circumstances in
which we think it is appropriate. In the meantime, try out new approaches in the lower federal courts.
This is the behavioral message that the lower federal courts have
found in Milliken. Their post-Milliken "institutional behavior" has
been to look to the circumstances of a particular case to discover reasons
why imposing an interdistrict remedy might be appropriate in that case.
And it is on this basis that I believe proponents of metropolitan desegregation must proceed to develop a post-Milliken strategy. While the "big
battle" has been lost, the "small wars" may still be won.
V.

THE STRATEGY FOR METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION

TODAY:

ON WINNING SMALL WARS

A.

GeneralStrategy andPreliminaryConsiderations
The essential strategy of metropolitan desegregation today must be to

193. As the post-Milliken cases indicate, it has not been "near-impossible" to persuade the courts of the appropriateness of interdistrict relief in the particular case.
194. DeU'Ario, supra note 2, at 149.
195. Id.
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win small wars, to focus on the interdistrict situation existing in a
particular metropolitan area, and to show that in the particular circumstances there is a "constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief."
There are a number of grounds, which will be discussed in more detail
shortly, that I believe can be relied upon to obtain interdistrict relief. To
the extent that these grounds are present in a particular situation, they
should be advanced cumulatively-that is, the advocate should argue
that while any one of the grounds would be sufficient if standing alone,
taken together, they clearly mandate an interdistrict remedy in the
special and limited circumstances of the case. The narrowness of a
favorable holding reduces the likelihood of Supreme Court review-and
at this time there is nothing to be gained by Supreme Court review
of a favorable lower court decision. Conversely, the narrowness of the
grounds advanced may make the Court more disposed to grant review of
an unfavorable decision because the Court could then make clear,
without undercutting Milliken, that there are circumstances in which it
will approve the imposition of an interdistrict remedy. In addition, if
interdistrict relief has been granted in a number of lower federal courts,
the Court may be persuaded to uphold such relief in the particular case
and will also have the "data" available if it wishes to formulate new or
broader guidelines.
In dealing with Milliken itself, the emphasis should be on its limited
sweep. The advocate should refer to the Court's own description of the
metropolitan desegregation question presented in Milliken:
[w]hether a federal court may impose a multidistrict, areawide remedy
to a single-district de jure segregation problem absent any finding that
the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary school
systems within their districts, absent any claim . . . that the boundary
lines of any affected school district were established with the purpose
of fostering racial segregation in the public schools, absent any finding
that the included districts committed acts which effected segregation
within the other districts, and absent a meaningful opportunity for the
included neighboring school districts to present evidence or be heard on
the propriety of a multidistrict remedy or on the question of constitutional violation by those neighboring districts. 9 6
On the one hand, Milliken should be distinguished in every factual
particular possible, but on the other hand, Milliken must be relied upon
affirmatively for the power of federal courts to cross school district lines
196. 418 U.S. at 721-22 (footnote omitted).
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whenever "there is a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict
relief."
With respect to the necessary showing of a violation, it may make a
difference if the case arises in a state in which segregation was formerly
required by law-the "southern situation"--because there may be a
connection between the state-imposed segregation and the racial disparity between school districts. Suburban districts, even though they have
relatively fewer black students than urban districts, may still be trying to
segregate students, as was the situation in the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation. Finding these suburbs to be in constitutional violation for
having failed to eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation may
loom significant in the determination of the propriety of interdistrict
relief.
Because of the deference that the Milliken majority gave to the
principle of local autonomy, consideration should also be given to the
particular state's law governing local school districts and to the structural posture in which the question of metropolitan desegregation arises.
For example, both in Milliken and in Bradley v. School Board, school
district lines were coterminous with political boundaries, and metropolitan desegregation would have involved more than one county. But in
Kentucky the boundary lines of independent school districts are not
likely to be coterminous with political boundaries because annexing a
territory to a municipality does not also involve annexing that territory
to the municipal school district. Since suburban territory recently annexed to the municipality is more likely to have a predominantly white
population than a black one, the effect will be, as it was in the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation, that a substantial number of white
children will reside within both the urban municipality and a suburban
school district. Thus, fewer whites will be available to desegregate the
urban district than if the school district lines and municipal boundaries
were coterminous.
Whether metropolitan desegregation can be accomplished within a
single county also may be important. In many states, as in Kentucky,
the county is the basic unit of education, and there are likely to be
statutory provisions for consolidating and merging independent school
districts in the county with the basic county district. Judicially ordered
merger, in accordance with the applicable provisions of state law, can
solve the administrative problems that so concerned the Court in Milliken. If, to be fully effective, an interdistrict remedy must embrace more
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than one county, there may also be state provisions authorizing the
consolidation of different county districts.
Another showing, that of interrelationship between the districts, can
be made to the extent that state law authorizes cooperation between
local school districts and to the extent that such cooperation has actually
occurred. With or without any showing that this interrelationship has
had a demonstrable segregative effect, it can be relied upon as an
independent factor to justify imposing an interdistrict remedy. All of
the above factors contribute to the structural posture in which the
question of metropolitan desegregation arises, and all should be considered in "making the case" for interdistrict relief in the particular circumstances.
The Groundsto Be Advanced
Turning to the grounds that may be advanced for the imposition of an
interdistrict remedy in particular cases, I shall consider initially the
grounds expressly recognized in Milliken. The first ground, that school
district lines have been drawn in a racially discriminatory manner, is
illustrated by cases such as Haney and United States v. Texas.' 97 Seemingly, this ground depends upon a showing of segregatory intent. As
that concept was defined in Keyes, 98 however, it may well be satisfied
by a showing of segregatory effect. 99 The ground is particularly
applicable in states in which segregation was formerly required by law.
Although Haney and United States v. Texas both involved small rural
districts, it may be possible in the metropolitan context to show that
particular urban-suburban lines were drawn to avoid requiring the
suburban districts to provide separate schools for the relatively few
blacks residing outside the inner city. Moreover, when the effect of recent school consolidations has been to concentrate black
students within a particular district, a strong argument can be made that
the school district lines were drawn in a racially discriminatory manner.
Certainly the concentration of black students within a particular district
raises the presumption that the concentration was not "accidental."200
B.

197. See text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
199. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Hoots v.
Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
200. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973), appealdismissed,
495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
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The second ground, that discriminatory acts of state officials or of one
districts "have been a substantial cause of interdistrict
or more school
segregation, '' 20 1 is a broad ground, susceptible to numerous interpretations. Necessarily left unanswered are the questions of how the causal
connection between the discriminatory acts and the resulting segregation
is to be established and what is meant by "substantial cause." Again,
the functional criterion may be one of showing a discriminatory effect
rather than a deliberate discriminatory intent. For example, in the
Louisville-Jefferson County litigation, the Louisville School District, in
cooperation with the Jefferson County district, located a high school
within the boundaries of the county school district, far from the centers
of black population within the Louisville district. This act, although
not contributing to interdistrict segregation, did contribute to the segregation that existed in the Louisville district. To this extent, the Jefferson County district was responsibile for segregation existing in the
Louisville district.
The Kentucky law providing that boundaries of an independent
school district do not expand with municipal annexation also had a
discriminatory effect, even if it was unintended. Approximately 10,000
children, mostly white, lived between the boundaries of the Louisville
School District and the outer boundaries of the city of Louisville. If the
"annexation area' had been included within the boundaries of the
Louisville School District, it would have been easier to accomplish
desegregation within that district. In that sense the state law provisions
substantially contributed to the "blackness" of the Louisville School
District and thus to interdistrict segregation.
Another example of state laws having a discriminatory effect and
substantially contributing to interdistrict segregation would occur if a
state law authorizing school district consolidation specifically excluded
urban school districts having a large percentage of blacks, 02 or if a plan
for metropolitan government did not include school district consolidation when there was a separate urban school district having a large
number of blacks.2 03 As these examples indicate, the second ground
201. 418 U.S. at 745.
202. See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), arf'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 381
(1975).
203. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
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can be used to good advantage in arguing that the circumstances of the
particular case justify interdistrict relief.
The third ground articulated in Milliken is the one suggested by
Justice Stewart, that racial disparity in urban-suburban residential areas,
with its concomitant effect on interdistrict school segregation, has been
caused "by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or
zoning laws. 204 Certainly, plaintiffs should make every effort to establish governmental responsibility for urban-suburban residential segregation; °5 either by itself, or in combination with other factors, this responsibility may persuade the court that an interdistrict remedy is appropri206
ate.
Moving beyond the grounds specifically articulated in Milliken, I
would suggest that there are at least two other "basic" grounds, consistent with Milliken, for imposing an interdistrict remedy. The first is the
situation in which the suburban districts sought to be included in the
metropolitan plan are themselves in constitutional violation; this violation alone should be sufficient to justify an interdistrict remedy involving
those districts. Especially in states in which segregation was formerly
required by law, such a violation may be common, as for example when
a suburban district attempts to confine its relatively few blacks to one or
more schools by means of geographic attendance zoning. In Milliken
the Court emphasized again and again that none of the districts included
in the metropolitan plan were shown to have "failed to operate unitary
school systems within their districts,"2 ° and that the "[d]isparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school
system, and not elsewhere; ' 20 8 thus the remedy had to be limited to the
Detroit system. If, however, an urban district and one or more adjoining suburban districts are all in constitutional violation, an interdistrict
remedy would not go "beyond the boundaries of the district where the
constitutional violation was found."20 9 I would submit, therefore, that
204. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
205. See generally Kushner & Werner, supra note 2; Taylor, supra note 2; Comment,
Comprehensive Metropolitan Planning: A Reinterpretationof Equal EducationalOppor-

tunity, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 388, 403-12 (1972).
206. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd mem., 96 S. Ct.
381 (1975).
207. 418 U.S. at 721; e.g., id. at 730, 735-36, 744-45, 746, 748. See also 418 U.S. at
754 (Stewart, J., concurring).
208. 418 U.S. at 746.
209. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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whenever all of the districts sought to be included within a desegregation
plan are themselves in constitutional violation and when the district
court concludes that an interdistrict remedy is necessary for effective
desegregation of the urban district, there has necessarily been a "constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief."
The suburban districts would in turn argue from Milliken that "the
scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation" 10 and that the court's decree must be limited to
eradicating the segregation found within each district. But there should
be no notion of a district's being a "little bit" in violation. White
students residing in suburban districts have no "right" to attend school
in their home district. If all of the districts within a given area are in
constitutional violation, the court must enter a decree that will effectively eliminate the constitutional violation. Certainly, it is not unreasonable to allow the court for this purpose to treat the area as a whole and
to disregard the boundary lines of the "violation" districts. Because
Milliken involved the situation in which a court had imposed "a multidistrict, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation problem,"21 the case arguably does not restrict a court's power to impose
a multidistrict remedy on a multidistrict de jure segregation problem.
The argument should certainly be made where applicable.
The second "basic" ground would arise in cases in which there has
been an "historic and continuing interrelationship" between the urban
district and the suburban districts sought to be included in the desegregation plan. Experience indicates that adjacent school districts, although autonomous, often do not operate in isolation from each other.
Frequently there will be state laws authorizing interdistrict cooperation.
This cooperation may have helped some districts minimize the burdens
of conforming to state-required segregation-for example, when the
black students of one district were able to attend the other district's
"black school"-and it may also have produced an interdistrict segregatory effect. 12 The theory, however, is not based on the interrelation210. 418 U.S. at 744.
211. Id. at 721.
212. If this circumstance exists, it should be treated as the situation where "racially
discriminatory acts of. . . local school districts .. . have been a substantial cause of
interdistrict segregation." Id. at 745. For an excellent state by state compilation of
segregation laws in force at the time of Brown, see SEGREGATION AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT IN THB UNITED STATES (B. Reams & P. Wilson eds. 1975).
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ship of the districts in achieving a segregatory purpose or producing a
egregatory effect, but rather on the interrelationship itself. If the
interrelationship has existed and the school district lines have been
disregarded by the districts themselves for various other purposes, the
argument follows that it is within the district court's equitable power to
disregard the district lines for purposes of school desegregation as well.
Of course, the argument's impact is greater when the district lines have
been disregarded for segregatory purposes, and still greater when they
have been disregarded with continuing segregatory effect,21 3 but the
rationale is the same: Because state law recognizes that school district
lines can be crossed 214 and because the districts have themselves actually
crossed the particular school district lines, the historic and continuing
interrelationship between the districts justifies crossing the lines and
imposing an interdistrict remedy in order to eliminate effectively the
constitutional violation found to exist within the urban district.
To summarize, the strategy for metropolitan desegregation in the
wake of Milliken must be to concentrate on winning small wars by
showing that in the circumstances of the particular case interdistrict
relief is appropriate. To the extent that they are available, the major
grounds that can be relied upon are: (1) all of the districts sought to be
included in the metropolitan desegregation plan are themselves in constitutional violation; (2) there has been an historic and continuing
interrelationship between the districts; (3) school district lines have
been drawn in a racially discriminatory manner, for example, along
racial lines to facilitate state-imposed segregation in pre-Brown days or
as part of school district consolidations that have concentrated black
students within a particular district or districts; (4) other discriminatory
acts of state officials or of one or more school districts have substantially
caused interdistrict segregation, for example, the school districts have
cooperated in enabling one or both to maintain segregation, or urban
school districts with a large percentage of blacks have been excluded
213. In the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation, the attendance of the Jefferson
County black high school students at Louisville's Central High School on a tuition basis
in pre-Brown days did not have a continuing segregatory effect, but the location of
Louisville's Atherton High School within the boundaries of the county school district far
from the centers of Louisville's black population did. The Sixth Circuit gave substantial
weight to this latter instance of cooperation. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of
Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1360 (6th Cir. 1974).
214. The argument could be made even if the school district lines have not in fact
been crossed, since they could potentially be crossed under state law. It is not improper
for a federal court to recognize this potential and to cross the lines if necessary.
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from school consolidation or governmental reorganization plans; and
(5) the racial disparity in urban-suburban residential areas was caused
"by purposeful racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning
laws."'21 5 All of the above grounds that are available in the particular
case, as well as any other grounds for an interdistrict remedy that the
particular circumstances suggest, should be emphasized. The essential
argument is that in the special circumstances of this case, the court
should order an interdistrict remedy. I will now proceed to illustrate
this approach "from within" by a discussion of the Louisville-Jefferson
County litigation. 1 6
VI.

METROPOLITAN DESEGREGATION IN LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON

COUNTY:

A.

THE VIEW FROM WITHIN

The Louisville-Jefferson County Situation

Louisville-Jefferson County is the largest metropolitan area in Kentucky with a county-wide population of close to 700,000, about half of
whom live within the city of Louisville.217 Although the basic unit of
public education under Kentucky law is the county and each county
constitutes a separate school district,218 there are provisions for independent school districts within the county districts. 219 School districts
are entities distinct from municipalities, and the annexation of unincorporated territory to a municipality does not have the effect of annexing
that territory to an independent school district within the municipality.22 0 This distinct entity status, in addition to the widespread tendency
of families with school-age children to reside in suburban areas rather
than core-city areas, had the effect of making the Jefferson County
School District about twice the size of the Louisville School District and
substantially all-white. At the time the litigation was commenced in
1972, the Jefferson County School District had approximately 96,000
students, about four percent of whom were black, while the Louisville
School District had approximately 45,000 students, roughly 50 percent
of whom were black. On a countywide basis, the white-black ratio was
80 percent to 20 percent. There was also a tiny independent school
215. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, I., dissenting).
216. See case cited note 8 supra.
217. The standard statistical metropolitan area includes part of southern Indiana.
218. Ky. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 160.010 (Baldwin 1973).
219. Id. § 160.020 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).

220. See Thomas v. Spragens, 308 Ky. 97, 213 S.W.2d 452 (1948).
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district in Jefferson County, Anchorage, which operated21 one eight-grade
elementary school for 350 very affluent white students.
Under Kentucky law an independent school district may merge with
the county school district, and if the school boards are unable to agree
upon the terms of merger, merger may be ordered by the state board of
education. 222 There are also statutory provisions authorizing transfers
of territory and cooperative arrangements between school districts. 23
Finally, because Jefferson County is the only county inKentucky containing a first-class city, legislation applicable only to the Jefferson
County and Louisville school districts has been enacted, 224 and such
legislation has been sustained by the Kentucky Court of Appeals against
charges of "special legislation. 225
In racial matters, Kentucky has always been a "southern state," and
prior to Brown, state law required racial segregation in the schools. 226 In
compliance with this law, the Jefferson County School District operated
a number of small one- to four-room black elementary schools and one
eight-grade black elementary school, Newburg, which was located in the
only area in the county having any substantial black population. All of
the black high school students living in the county district were bused to
Louisville's black high school, Central, which they attended on a tuition
basis, as authorized under Kentucky law. After Brown, the black high
school students from the county were permitted to attend the county's
high schools, and the one- to four-room black elementary schools were
gradually closed. Newburg was rezoned along with the other elementary schools on a purportedly neutral basis, but because its attendance
zone encompassed much of the Newburg area, it remained an allblack school. Within a three-mile radius of Newburg were nine allwhite or virtually all-white elementary schools. As is ordinarily the case
221. These facts, as well as those following, are taken largely from the Sixth Circuit's
opinion the first time the case was before the court, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973), but are supplemented from my own
knowledge of the case when necessary.
222. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 160.041 (Baldwin 1973).
223. E.g., id. § 158.130; id. § 160.045 (Baldwin Supp. 1974).
224. E.g., id. § 160.048 (Baldwin 1973) (transfer of territory); id. H§ 160.402, .160,
.200, .210 (Baldwin Supp. 1974) (election of board members in the event of merger
between the county and independent school districts); id. § 160.607-.609 (additional
taxing authority).
225. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 522 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1975).
226. Law of Mar. 22, 1904, ch. 85, [19041 Ky. Acts 181 (repealed 1966); see Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding statute).
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in a suburban district, there were a substantial number of students in
Jefferson County who were being bused to the schools they attended. 227
Newburg, however, was an all walk-in school, although a number of
the nine white schools surrounding it were heavy busing schools.
As is common in many urban districts, the Louisville School District
was an all walk-in district using the neighborhood school method of
geographic attendance zoning. During the 1956-1957 school year, the
city district embarked upon a much-heralded desegregation program in
which all students were assigned to their neighborhood schools without
regard to race. Because in pre-Brown days black schools had naturally
enough been located in black residential areas and white schools in
white residential areas, geographic attendance zoning could produce
little actual desegregation. This failure was further aggravated by the
transfers permitted students who had been assigned to schools formerly
attended by members of the other race. Eighty-five percent of the white
children who were assigned to pre-Brown black schools transferred to
pre-Brown white schools, while 45 percent of the black children who
were assigned to pre-Brown white schools transferred to pre-Brown
black schools. The result was that during the "banner year" of desegregation, 80 percent of all white students were attending schools that were
at least 90 percent white and 76 percent of the black students were
attending schools that were at least 90 percent black. 228 This degree of
racial concentration fluctuated somewhat over the years as population
patterns changed and the system became "blacker" with the movement
of white families to the county school district, 229 but at no time were less
than 50 percent of the white students attending schools 90 percent or
more white or less than 50 percent of the black students attending
227. At the time of litigation, approximately 65 percent of these children were being
bused.
228. As we pointed out in our brief before the Sixth Circuit: "It is understandable
why there was so little opposition to desegregation in Louisville; so little of it actually
occurred." Brief for Appellant at 27, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973).
229. As the black population increased in Louisville, it moved westward from the
central part of the city, with the result that a number of pre-Brown white schools located
in the west end of Louisville became virtually all-black along with the pre-Brown white
schools located in the central part of the city. The pattern in Louisville then was proBrown white schools that had remained white, pro-Brown black schools that had
remained black, and pre-Brown white schools, often located in close proximity to a preBrown black school or to a pro-Brown black school that had been closed, that were now
black schools.
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schools 90 percent or more black.2""
The Louisville-Jefferson County case is a classic example of litigation
generated by the Supreme Court's decision in Swann. Prior to Swann,

the Sixth Circuit had held that geographic attendance zoning was an
adequate means of desegregation even though it did not result in much
actual desegregation.2 3 1 In order to achieve desegregation in Louisville,
or of the Newburg school in the Jefferson County district, it appeared
that a "policy of segregation" would have to be shown. 232 After Swann,

it was sufficient to proceed on a "vestiges" approach, and we 233 were
fairly confident that under this approach, we could achieve desegregation within the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts.
In Jefferson County, everything hinged on Newburg, which was the

one pre-Brown black elementary school that had remained in existence
and had retained its racial identity to the present time. Because it was
surrounded by nine all-white or virtually all-white elementary schools, it

could easily be desegregated by busing some of the white children to
Newburg and some of the Newburg children to the white schools. At

the time of the litigation, however, there were two other elementary
schools, Price and Cane Run, which were rapidly becoming racially

identifiable black schools. Price, named after a long-time black principal of Newburg, was constructed in 1969 within a mile of Newburg.
When Price opened, it was 33 percent black, but by 1972-1973 had
increased to 54 percent black. Like Newburg, it was a virtually all
walk-in school with only three percent of its students being bused, and it

too had a black principal, the only other black principal in the system.
When the case came to trial, there was also evidence of a policy of
230. During the 1971-1972 school year, when the litigation was commenced, 67
percent of the white students were attending schools 90 percent or more white while 72
percent of the black students were attending schools 90 percent or more black.
231. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 406 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1969).
232. Once litigation was commenced, there was evidence that would show a policy of
segregation on the part of both districts, such as Louisville's location of the relatively few
post-Brown schools that it built in areas of racial concentration and its racially
discriminatory pattern of teacher and faculty assignment. With respect to Jefferson
County, see text following note 234 infra.
233. By "we," I am referring to the groups sponsoring the Louisville-Jefferson County
litigation: the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union, the Louisville Branch of the N.A.A.C.P.,
and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights. It should be recognized today that
litigation such as this is a group effort or what may be called a "public action," in which
the identity of the named plaintiffs is not important.
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segregation 8 4 -namely that Price and Newburg were being under
utilized, Newburg grossly so, at a time when several of the surrounding
white schools were operating well beyond capacity and using split shifts
and temporary mobile classrooms.
Cane Run, the third school with which we were concerned, was
located in a different part of the district. Blacks had begun to move
into that area in 1968, and all the black children living there were
assigned to Cane Run, the black percentage of which increased from 1.2
percent in 1966-1967 to 49 percent in 1972-1973. During 1972 Cane
Run was rebuilt at the same site. The school was surrounded by a
number of all-white or virtually all-white schools, and all of the schools,
including Cane Run, were heavy busing schools.
Of the black elementary students in the Jefferson County district, 56
percent were confined to these three elementary schools. Because
Newburg was not desegregated, the Jefferson County School District
had not eliminated all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. We argued
that since this circumstance existed, any actions the district took with
respect to other schools "must be judged according to whether they
hinder or further the process of school desegregation. '28 The Jefferson
County district could effectively desegregate within its own boundaries
by clustering Newburg, Price, and Cane Run with the surrounding allwhite schools, and this action would have brought it into constitutional
compliance.280
The Louisville district was a prime example of an urban school
district using geographic zoning and the hallowed neighborhood school
system to practice "educational apartheid." Beginning with a pre234. The second largest urban area in Kentucky, Lexington-Fayette County, had
merged its schools in 1967. Using geographic attendance zoning, it too had maintained
a large number of racially identifiable schools on the elementary and junior high school
levels, and we brought suit to desegregate it. See Jefferson v. Board of Educ., 344 F.
Supp. 688 (E.D. Ky. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1973). In that case too,
once the suit was brought, there was sufficient evidence to establish a policy of
segregation.
235. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 929 (6th Cir.
1973).
236. We first filed a separate suit, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
Civil No. 73-1403 (E.D. Ky., filed Aug. 1971), challenging only the segregation that
existed within the Jefferson County district. When we decided to file the "boundarycrossing" suit, Haycraft v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 73-1408 (E.D. Ky., filed May
1972), we let the Newburg suit "sit," and the cases were subsequently consolidated for
trial and decision.
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Brown racially monolithic structure, the district built upon this structure
by locating the relatively few schools constructed after Brown in areas of
racial concentration. 27 At the time of trial, it was operating a system in
which five of its six senior high schools, nine of its 13 junior high
schools, and 40 of its 46 elementary schools were racially identifiable in
38
student composition.
Having watched the district change in the last 15 years from a system
25 percent black to one that was 50 percent black and growing blacker
and poorer, the Louisville School Board was acutely conscious of the
problem of white flight and of the general movement of whites toward
the suburbs. In an effort to stem this tide, the board had in effect
"struck a deal" between the black and the white communities in Louisville: Racial segregation would be maintained, but at the same time
"quality education" would be provided for the district's black and lowerincome white children. Led by a very progressive and able superintendent, the school board established a number of special programs aimed at
improving the educational performance of black and lower-income
white children..2 39 To provide some degree of community control, miniboards were organized in the various areas of the district and were given
a "say" in the appointment of principals and teachers. This "say" was
reflected in the pattern of teacher and principal assignment, with practically all of the black schools having black principals and a proportionately higher number of black teachers than the white schools. Because of the large number of racially identifiable schools, whic a could
easily be eliminated by busing, Louisville was an easy target for desegregation after Swann.
The Louisville School Board and its officials insisted-and I believe sincerely-that they were not opposed to desegregation, but that
237. The district had built nine new schools: one racially identifiable white high
school, one racially identifiable white junior high school, and seven elementary schools.
Four of the seven elementary schools were racially identifiable black schools upon
opening, and one became over 80 percent black shortly thereafter.
238. It is not necessary to get into a "numbers argument" about what makes a school
racially identifiable. Uually the school will be virtually all-white or all-black, and
almost always 90 percent or more one race. This 90 percent ratio was true of practically
all of the schools involved in our complaint but we included a few elementary schools
that were 80 percent or more black in the category of racially identifiable schools.
239. Such improvement as had occurred was minimal, and the Louisville officials
admitted that the best way of improving the academic performance of black and lowerincome white students would be to place them in predominantly middle-class white
schools.
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because of the problem of white flight, desegregation within the limits of
the Louisville district alone would be counterproductive. Middle-class
whites could flee to the adjoining Jefferson County district, and the
Louisville district would then become blacker and poorer. The situation was complicated by the question of a possible merger between the
Louisville and Jefferson County districts. The Louisville Board appeared to believe that its "quality education" program would work if
given enough time and money and took the position that the county
board and its officials would not be responsive to the special needs of
black and lower-income white children. There was also a marked
difference in the educational philosophies of the two boards. The
Louisville Board did not want to be absorbed into the county system,
and when push came to shove, it opted for continued segregation and
"quality education" and resisted our suit. At the same time, however,
the Louisville Board consistently maintained the position that if desegregation were to be ordered, it could only be effective on a metropolitanwide basis.
B.

The Pre-MillikenLitigation

Our theory of metropolitan desegregation essentially ignored the involvement of the state, either in the segregation that existed within the
school districts or in regard to its control over education generally. In
May 1972, when we filed suit, both 'the Richmond and Detroit cases had
been decided by the district courts and were on appeal, and we were
aware of the approach taken in those cases. But since our case was so
different-particularly in that both our districts were still in constitutional violation and in that there had been an historic and continuing
relationship between the two districts for segregatory and other purposes
-"state involvement" seemed to add little to our case. Moreover, we
wanted to proceed on a different theory precisely because it could not be
known at that time whether the state involvement approach would work.
Indeed, while the case was awaiting trial, the Fourth Circuit decided
Bradley, which persuaded the district judge in our case that he could not
2 40
cross school district boundaries in any case.
Our argument was that the court had the power to cross the boundary
lines between the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts to
240. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 932 (6th Cir.
1973).
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achieve effective desegregation within both districts because: (1) the
relief would be limited to a single county, the basic unit of education in
Kentucky, and therefore could be administered in a manner consistent
with the state laws relating to independent and county schools districts;
(2) both districts were in constitutional violation; (3) school district
lines consistent with state law had been disregarded by the school
districts in the past for segregatory and other purposes; (4) the boundaries of the school districts were not coterminous with political boundaries, and a substantial number of white children were located in an area
within the political boundaries of the city of Louisville but not within
the Louisville School District.
There was some disagreement among the groups sponsoring the
litigation 24 1 about whether the ultimate remedy should be a merger of
the Louisville and Jefferson County districts or whether it should be
limited to attaching the "annexation area" with its 10,000 white students
to the Louisville district. This disagreement resulted in a suit seeking
annexation, coupled with an intervention seeking merger and the inclusion of the Anchorage School District in the desegregation plan.2 42 The
precise form of relief was irrelevant, however, until we established that
the school district lines could be crossed in this case. In fact, by the
time the case reached the Sixth Circuit, all of the sponsoring groups
agreed that merger and county-wide desegregation was the only feasible solution.
The case came to trial in December 1972. Although the district
judge had ruled that he did not have the power to cross school district
lines, he allowed us to introduce evidence showing the historic and
continuing interrelationship between the Louisville and Jefferson County
districts. We showed that in pre-Brown days the black high school
241. See note 233 supra.
242. The inclusion of the Anchorage district has created serious theoretical problems,
far beyond the practical importance (to us) of including its 350 very affluent white
students in the desegregation plan. On the first "go around," its inclusion could be
justified under the Sixth Circuit's decision in Milliken. On remand, however, we shifted
ground and argued that the all-white Anchorage district was itself a vestige of stateimposed segregation because it was established under a statute that authorized the
establishment of an independent district if it contained 200 or more white children, thus
encouraging the formation of small all-white enclaves. See KY. REv. STAT. § 160.020
(1948), as amended, Ky.REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.020 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). The Sixth
Circuit left this question for the district court to decide, and it was somewhat less than
impressed with our argument on this score. On February 4, 1976, the district court entered an order denying relief we sought. We are likely to appeal.
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students residing in Jefferson County had attended Louisville's Central
High School on a tuition basis and that the Louisville Board had located
the virtually all-white Atherton High School within the boundaries of
the Jefferson County School District, far from the centers of black
population in the Louisville School District,243 and had permitted some
Jefferson County students to attend Atherton. We also placed in the
record examples of legislative recognition of the interrelationship between the two districts, such as legislation dealing specifically with the
transfer of property between the two districts 24 4 and legislation giving
special taxing powers to the two districts alone pursuant to a financial
arrangement that the districts themselves had worked out.245
In March 1973, the district court ruled, quite inexplicably, that both
districts were in constitutional compliance because we had not shown
that the existing segregation was due to anything other than the neighborhood school system resulting from geographic attendance zoning.
The court noted, however, that if the Louisville School District were
required to desegregate within its boundaries, white flight would make
the desegregation counterproductive.246 On December 28, 1973, the
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court on the question whether the
districts were in constitutional compliance and, in light of its decision in
Milliken, held that the district court had the power to impose an
interdistrict remedy here. 247 On July 24, 1974, after a four-day evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order approving a desegregation plan under which the Louisville and Jefferson County school
243. If the school had remained at the former site, it would presumably have been
desegregated, as was a junior high school located there.
244. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 160.048 (Baldwin 1973).
245. Id. § 160.607, as amended, id. §§ 160.607-.609 (Baldwin Supp. 1974). The first
$600,000 was to go to "any school district within the county operating with a financial
deficit prior to July 1, 1971," which was the Louisville School District.
246. Haycraft v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 73-1408 (E.D. Ky., Mar. 8, 1973);
Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 73-1403 (E.D. Ky., Mar. 8, 1973).
If the power to cross school district lines did exist, no one ever seriously questioned the
proposition that the power would have to be exercised to eliminate effectively the
segregation found to exist within both districts.
247. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973).
We -had argued before the Sixth Circuit that the court should not rest its holding on the
power to cross school district lines on its decision in Milliken; our case was a stronger
one and no one could then know how the Supreme Court would decide Milliken.
Although the court did discuss the differences between our case and Milliken, it did not
expressly develop a different rationale for holding that the power to cross boundary lines
existed in our ease.
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districts would be merged. 48 and all of the schools within the county
would be desegregated, with no school less than 16 percent nor more
than 24 percent black in composition.
C.

The Post-Milliken Litigation

1.

Our Arguments on Remand

The district court order remained in effect for exactly two days. The
school boards had petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari after the
Sixth Circuit had ruled in our favor, and on July 26, 1974, when the
Supreme Court decided Milliken, the Supreme Court entered the following order in our case:
Petitions for writs of certiorari granted. Judgments vacated and cases
remanded for further consideration in light of Milliken v. Bradley ....
Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, and Mr.
Justice Marshall would grant certiorari and without further briefing
249
or oral argument affirm the judgments.
We were unsuccessful in our efforts to persuade the Sixth Circuit to
hear the case immediately, but the court ordered an expedited appeal,
and the case was argued in October 1974. Our basic approach remained the same as before, but we expanded our arguments and tried to
relate them to the "interdistrict violation" test of Milliken. First, of
course, we emphasized the factual differences between our case and
Milliken. Second, in what may be called our "Milliken argument," we
argued that in the circumstances of our case an interdistrict remedy was
proper and possibly even required under Milliken. And third, we
argued that because our case involved two districts located in a single
county, both of which were in constitutional violation, the case was
controlled by Wright and Scotland Neck rather than by Milliken.250
In our first argument, we distinguished Milliken in every way
possible: (1) The major difference, of course, was that here both
248. The district court incorporated in its decree all the provisions of state law
relating to school district merger, including the provisions specifically applicable to a
merger within Jefferson County. Anchorage's one elementary school was also included
in the plan, but the court did not order the merger of Anchorage with the Jefferson
County district.
249. Board of Educ. v. Newburg Area Council, Inc., 418 U.S. 918 (1974).
250. We did not pay much attention to Anchorage, although, as pointed out previously, we argued that it should be included in the desegregation plan because the district
itself was a vestige of state-imposed segregation.
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districts were found to be in constitutional violation. 51 (2) Unlike
Milliken, the present suit was brought to end segregation existing in
both districts and from the outset had sought to impose an interdistrict
remedy. (3) In Milliken the segregation existing within the Detroit
district was violative of state law, while in the Louisville and Jefferson
County districts, the segregation was required by state law prior to
Brown. (4) Because desegregation in our case involved the basic state
educational unit-the county-school district lines could be crossed in a
manner fully consistent with state law, whether by merger or otherwise,
and thus the serious administrative problems that concerned the Court
in Milliken could be avoided. (5) Here, unlike Milliken, school district
lines did not follow political boundaries, and including the 10,000 white
children who lived in the "annexation area" in the Louisville School
District would have facilitated desegregation within the Louisville district. (6) In Milliken, there was no history of interaction between the
Detroit and suburban school districts included in the metropolitan desegregation plan, whereas in our case there was a continuous history of interaction between the districts, as evidenced by the sending of county
black students to Central, the location of Atherton in the county school
district and the attendance of county students there, and the special legislation involving the two districts. Thus, we argued that the very significant differences between the situation presented in Milliken and that
presented in our case clearly demonstrated that Milliken in no way precluded the imposition of an interdistrict remedy in our case.
Our second argument, our "Milliken" argument, had three parts.
First, we argued that crossing school district lines was justified in metropolitan Louisville because both districts were in constitutional violation,
particularly since they were located in a single county, the basic educational unit in the state, and the interdistrict remedy could be imposed in
accordance with the provisions of state law.252 Second, we developed
the historic and continuing interrelationship argument fully,25 8 empha251. The substantive issue of constitutional violation on the part of the boards was
not before the court on remand. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ,, 510
F.2d 1358, 1359 (6th Cir. 1974).
252. The rationale for arguing that an interdistrict remedy can be imposed when all
of the districts sought to be included in a metropolitan desegregation plan are in
constitutional violation has been set forth above. See text accompanying notes 207-11
supra. We made essentially the same argument here, limiting it, however, to two
districts located within the same county.
253. This argument proceeds on the assumption that only the urban district is in
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sizing that the school district lines did not have independent signifi-

cance,"

4

that they had been disregarded in the past in conforming to

state-imposed segregation,2 55 and that they were still being disregarded
for various nonsegregatory purposes in accordance with state law.2"'

Therefore, we argued that if a federal district court disregarded school
district lines on these facts it would be doing nothing more than that

which the school boards themselves had done and that which was
recognized by state law. Third, we combined these first two arguments
and attempted to show that there was a "demonstrated relationship"
between the segregation existing in the county district and that existing
in the Louisville district.
This "demonstrated relationship" was our effort to bring the case
squarely within the "interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect" language of Milliken. First, there was the matter of the 10,000 white

students residing in the "annexation area."

If school district lines had

not been drawn the way they were, that is, if the boundaries of the

Louisville School District did expand coterminously with the boundaries of the City of Louisville, it would have been possible to achieve

greater desegregation within the Louisville School District alone.
Of more significance to showing an interdistrict violation and effect
was our argument that in Jefferson County as a whole, it was the
separation of the school districts, coupled with the requirement of stateimposed segregation, that was responsible for the patterns of segregation
existing in both districts. This argument was based squarely on the
violation, and that since the school district lines have already been disregarded by the
districts themselves and/or by the state, there is no reason why a federal court should
not be able to disregard them in order to insure effective desegregation of the urban
district. See text accompanying notes 212-14 supra. I argued that this rationale applied
with even greater force in our case because both districts were in violation and both were
located within a single county, the basic educational unit in the state.
254. It was helpful to note that when the legislature enacted a statute authorizing the
transfer of territory between the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts, it
referred to the boundary lines of the districts as being "artificially drawn." Ky. R v.
STAT. ANN. § 160.048(1) (Baldwin 1973).
255. We emphasized, of course, the attendance of county black students at Central
and the location of Atherton within the boundaries of the county school districts.
256. The legislature recognized this interrelationship by authorizing the transfer of
school territory between the districts, see statute cited note 244 supra, by granting special
taxing powers reflecting an arrangement made between the boards themselves, see note
245 supra, and by providing for the election of board members in the event of a merger
between the two districts, see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 160.042, .160, .200, .210 (Baldwin
Supp. 1974).
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problem of white flight, a problem relied on both by Louisville to
explain why it could not desegregate within its boundaries and, interestingly enough, by Jefferson County to explain the racially identifiable
character of its three black or relatively black elementary schools. Our
argument was a simple one. Although the great majority of black
children living in Jefferson County lived within the Louisville School
District, prior to Brown this pattern was irrelevant because both districts
were operating segregated school systems. After Brown, any attempt to
desegregate within the Louisville district alone would create problems of
white flight to the adjoining Jefferson County School District, as the
district court had recognized;2 57 therefore, the Louisville School District
felt it could not desegregate by cross-busing. If there had not been
separate districts, all of the schools within the county could have been
desegregated below the "tip ratio,' 252 because the countywide black
student population was only 20 percent. This being so, the separation
of school districts in Jefferson County had the same effect as if the
district boundaries had been deliberately drawn on racial lines, 5 9 and
the separation had operated to prevent the desegregation of the Louisville School District.2 0 We concluded in this vein:
Even -though school segregation was required by law, if Jefferson County
had not 'been divided into two separate school districts whose boundary
lines were drawn as they were, when school segregation was no longer
constitutionally permissible, desegregation could have occurred in Jefferson County, unencumbered by any problem of white flight, and all
the schools located within what is now the Louisville school district and
what is now the Jefferson County school district could fully and effec2 61
tively be desegregated.

Our third basic argument-our "area!' argument-was that Milliken
did not even apply here, and that the case was instead controlled by
Wright and Scotland Neck.2" 2 This argument began as follows: When
257. See note 246 supra and accompanying text.
258. In its original opinion the district court had found that "the tip ratio theory has
proven itself in the Louisville District as we regrettably believe it has elsewhere."
259. In dealing with claims of racial discrimination, the primary emphasis has been
on discriminatory effect. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
260. We argued that as long as Louisville would not desegregate its schools, Jefferson
County had tried to make its schools attractive to whites and thus had confined 56
percent of its black elementary school students to three black or relatively black schools.
261. Reply Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 14, Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
262. I saw this analysis as an important backup argument if the Sixth Circuit on
remand were disposed toward reading Milliken too broadly.
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two school districts are located in a single county, which is the basic
educational unit of the state, and these districts can be merged into a
single district under state law, the applicable area for desegregation
purposes is the county; when all vestiges of state-imposed segregation
have not been eliminated in either district, a federal court must impose a
remedy on a county-wide basis if the failure to do so would not
effectively eliminate all vestiges of state-imposed segregation in both of
the separate districts. Then, because both Wright and Scotland Neck
were based on the adverse effect that "secession" would have on the
desegregation of the remaining district, we argued:
There is no functional difference between holding that a single district
not yet fully desegregated cannot split into separate districts, even
though this is authorized by state law, and holding that separate districts forming part of a potential single district under state law, both of
which are not yet desegregated, cannot remain separate where this
would impede desegregation of one of the separate districts, or more
2 63
accurately, of the potential single district as a whole.

I believed that the oral argument would give a good indication of the
"behavioral dynamic" of the lower federal courts after Milliken, and it
was clear that the Sixth Circuit--or at least the panel that decided our
case 2 -was not "reading" Milliken broadly and did not see Milliken
as effectively precluding metropolitan desegregation in most cases. The
questioning from the bench focused on the differences between Milliken
and our case, including the fact of our case's arising in a state where
segregation was formerly required by law. The court was not awed by
Milliken; rather it seemed to be trying to justify imposing an interdistrict
remedy, Milliken notwithstanding.
2.

The Sixth CircuitDecision

On December 11, 1974, the court handed down its decision. As I
expected after the oral argument, the court reaffirmed its prior holding
that the school district lines between the Louisville and Jefferson County
school districts could be crossed.2 65 The core of the court's opinion was
directed toward distinguishing Milliken, and the court did so on a
number of grounds. The "vital distinction," of course, was that both
263.
Educ.,
264.
265.

Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 31, Newburg Area Council, Inc., v. Board of
510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
The same panel that heard the case originally heard it on remand.
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974).
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districts were in constitutional violation, 26 0 and I continue to believe that

whenever this can be shown, a court will be disposed to find that an
interdistrict remedy is proper. Second, since the interdistrict remedy
would involve only two districts in a single county, 67 the remedy
would not be likely extensively to disrupt and alter the structure of
public education in Kentucky, or even in Jefferson County, nor require
-the creation of a vast new super school district, as may have resulted
26 8
from the broad metropolitan remedy considered in Milliken.
Third, the court noted that in Kentucky the county was the basic
educational unit by statute and that the legislature had referred in a
statute to the boundaries of school districts as "artificially drawn school
district lines.

'269

In contrast, "[sitatutes of this character were not in

effect in Michigan and consequently were not considered by the Supreme Court in Milliken. '270

Fourth, unlike the situation that caused

the Supreme Court concern in Milliken, any administrative problems in
the Louisville case could be obviated by the merger or consolidation of
the districts under the express provisions of Kentucky law. And finally,
there was the "crucial difference" that in our case school district lines
have been ignored in the past for the purposes of aiding and implementing continued segregation. Such disregarding of school district lines
continues ,tohave an effect on racial imbalance in the county's schools,
particularly in the location of Atherton High School in the county and
away from the core city of Louisville. 271
The court noted in this connection that while the busing of county black
high school students to Louisville's Central High School in pre-Brown
days might not have by itself been sufficient to justify an interdistrict
remedy,2 71 the Atherton situation continued to have a segregatory effect,
resulting from the cooperation between the two school districts that
were to be included in the interdistrict remedy. An additional factor
"materially aggravat[ing] the difficulties in disestablishing the dual city
school system" '2 7 8 was the residence in the annexation area of 10,000
266. Id. at 1359.
267. At most three districts would be involved if Anchorage were included.
268. 510 F.2d at 1360.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. The court here was referring to the "Carver District situation" in Milliken.
See note 148 supra.
273. 510 F.2d at 1361.
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white children. Based on all these factors, the court concluded "that the
school district lines in Jefferson County, Kentucky, have been crossed
for the purpose and with the actual effect of segregating school children
among the public schools of the county on the basis of race. 2 74
The court also accepted our "area" argument, based on the applicability of Wright and Scotland Neck. The court stated:
We are not confronted here with the problem in Milliken in which
the remedy approved by the Court of Appeals was broader than the
constitutional violation. Rather, the situation presented is that of two
districts in the same county of the state being equally guilty in failing
to eliminate all vestiges of segregation mandated by the same Kentucky
statute...
In [Wright and Scotland Neck] the Supreme Court refused to permit
the establishment of separate school districts within a single county,
even though authorized by state law, where it was found that this
would impede the process of dismantling a segregated school system.
By analogy no justification appears for permitting the city and county
school districts in Jefferson County to remain completely autonomous
if the effect is to impede the process of desegregating the schools of the
county as a whole.2 75
The court then reinstated its opinion of December 28, 1973, and
authorized the district court to impose an interdistrict remedy if necessary to eliminate effectively all vestiges of state-imposed segregation
existing in the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts.2 7 6
Shortly thereafter, the Louisville School District initiated a petition for
unconditional merger with the Jefferson County School District, which
was approved by the State Board of Education, and thus effectively
insulated from Supreme Court review the issue of crossing school district
lines in Jefferson County.2-77 Then on July 30, 1975, the district court
ordered the implementation of a county-wide desegregation plan pre274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1359, 1361. The court directed, however, that any plan providing for an
interdistrict remedy was to be postponed until all appeals, if any, in connection with the
plan were exhausted. Although the court did not cite the statute, this requirement was
in accord with the so-called "Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974." See 20
U.S.C.A. § 1752 (Supp. 1975).
277. The Jefferson County district sought certiorari only on the question whether it
and the Louisville board (to whose "liabilities" it had succeeded on merger) were in
constitutional violation, and the petition was denied. 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
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pared by the court.17 8 Thus, despite Milliken, metropolitan desegregation has occurred in Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky.

D. In Summary
The Sixth Circuit decision on remand can be said to be based on the

following factors: (1) both districts were in constitutional violation; (2)
the interrelationship between the districts resulted in a disregarding of

school district lines, which had a continuing segregatory effect; (3) the
way in which the boundary lines were drawn under state law-that is,
that the boundaries of the independent school district did not expand
with the boundaries of the city-had the effect of aggravating the
difficulties of disestablishing the dual city system; and (4) there would

be no significant administrative problems in implementing the interdistrict remedy. Any of these factors can be relied on by analogy in
another case and can be related to other factors that may be present.
The court also held that when both districts in the same county are in

constitutional violation, the principles of Wright and Scotland Neck
apply: The districts will not be permitted to remain separate "if the
effect is to impede the process of desegregating the schools of the county
as a whole. '2 79 Confronted with the problem of metropolitan desegregation and the imposition of an interdistrict remedy in the wake of
Milliken, the Sixth Circuit in the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation

has exhibited an "institutional behavior" similar to that of other courts
confronted with metropolitan desegregation or interdistrict remedies. It
278. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., Civil Nos. 7045 & 7291 (W.D.
Ky., July 30, 1975). Under the court's plan, any elementary school with a black
population not less than 12 percent nor more than 40 percent and any secondary school
with a black population of not less than 12 1/2 percent nor more than 35 percent would
be considered already sufficiently desegregated. Most of the high schools would range
from 14 to 23 percent black in composition. In devising its plan, the court stated that it
had "meticulously followed the priorities and remedies set forth in the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act of 1974"--"to the extent that the Court believes that the Act complies
with the Constitution as interpreted by the current decisions of the federal courts." Id.
at 4, 2. In addition, a Special Master would "continually monitor the implementation"
of the desegregation plan by attending all of the Board meetings "to express the view of
the Court in regard to all matters before the Board which relate to desegregation" and by
receiving from the superintendant annual reports of the racial percentages in each school
and other relevant matters. Id. at 20. The court specifically ordered that "if any
individual school ratio or population changes in a material fashion, appropriate steps
[would] be taken to include the individual school and its students in the general
transportation plan." Id. at 3.
279. 510 F.2d at 1361.
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is this "institutional behavior" which persuades me of the soundness of
the strategy of concentrating on "winning small wars."
VII.

THE "CONTEMPORARY Milliken" CASES

Several cases involving metropolitan desegregation or the crossing of
school district lines have either arisen after Miliken was decided or have
been reconsidered in the light of Milliken. These cases will be discussed in this section along with other "contemporary" cases whose
results would not appear to be affected by Milliken. Although relatively
few in number, these cases, considered in conjunction with -the Sixth
0
Circuit's decision in the Louisville-Jefferson County case on remand, 2
indicate to me a clear behavioral trend and an institutional behavior of
federal courts that in no way reflects a drawing back after Milliken or a
reluctance to consider the appropriateness of an interdistrict remedy.
The clearest ground for imposing an interdistrict remedy, specifically
recognized in Milliken, is the situation in which school district lines have
been drawn in a racially discriminatory manner. This ground is available when the existence of an all black or predominantly black school
district can be shown to be related to pre-Brown state-imposed segregation, 2-8 as was the case in United States v. Missouri. 82 Until 1937, the
Kinloch district in St. Louis County had operated separate, segregated
schools for blacks and whites, as required by Missouri law. In 1937,
however, Kinloch was left as a small, virtually all black district when the
city of Berkeley, which was located within the Kinloch district, incorporated itself as a city and thus became a separate school system. By
agreement, the few whites remaining in the Kinloch district attended
school in the adjoining Berkeley district, and the few blacks residing in
Berkeley attended school in Kinloch. Over the years a number of
school district reorganization plans had been proposed for St. Louis
County, but Kinloch was generally excluded from these plans, even
though its small number of students and low assessed valuation made "it
a prime candidate for reorganization under the standards employed by
280. This was the only "interdistrict remedy" case pending at the time of Milliken
and thus the only case specifically remanded for further consideration in light of it.
281. E.g., Haney v. Board of Educ., 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972); see text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
282. 363 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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the county board." 288 The single time, in 1949, that Kinloch was
included in a reorganization plan with Berkeley and Ferguson-Florissant
(Ferguson), another white school district in the area, the plan was
defeated in a referendum. As of 1971-1972, Kinloch remained virtually
all-black, Berkeley had become about 20 percent black, and Ferguson
remained virtually all-white.284
The district court concluded that Kinloch was created as a part of
Missouri's dual system of public education and remained "as a vestige of
that system. 2 8s 5 In addition,
the factual circumstances here, which show that, because of the race
of its resident students, Kinloch district was created and maintained
through state action as a small, racially segregated and inadequately
funded school district, establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause -that requires affirmative, corrective action by the State of Missouri and its instrumentalities.

286

Subsequently, in 1975, the district court approved a desegregation plan
consolidating the Kinloch, Berkeley, and Ferguson school districts into a
single new district.28 7 Quoting from Milliken that "'an interdistrict
remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one
or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district
or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of
race,' "128 the district court asserted:
This latter statement accurately describes what the evidence in this
case shows and what this Court has previously found, i.e., an arrangement of school districts which has caused substantial segregation and
which is both a vestige of the previously imposed dual school system
and a continuing effect of racially discriminatory state actions on the
part of the defendants in this case.280
283. Id. at 745.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 747.
286. Id.
287. United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 374 (1975).
288. Id. at 1059, quoting 418 U.S. at 745.
289. 388 F. Supp. at 1059. The Ferguson district argued that it should not be
included in the consolidation because it "was not directly involved in the creation of
Kinloch as an all black district." Id. The court rejected this argument, noting that in
Haney and United States v. Texas, "specific acts of discriminatory conduct were not
found to have been perpetuated by adjoining school districts" and that in a sense
Ferguson was responsible for the maintenance of Kinloch as an all-black district since
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the interdistrict desegregation plan adopted by the district court, 290 despite the disapproval of all three of the districts concerned. The court emphasized
first that no district seriously questioned "the district court's finding that
Kinloch was racially segregated by discriminatory state action."2 91 Although Ferguson had not been an active participant in creating the segregation existing in Kinloch, nevertheless the court of appeals found
no error in the district court's conclusion that Ferguson, like Berkeley,
29 2
was responsible for maintaining Kinloch in its segregative condition.
To remedy the constitutional violation, an interdistrict remedy was appropriate. Accepting the conclusions that a merger between Berkeley
and Kinloch alone "offered little chance for meaningful desegregation"2 9 and that a merger between Ferguson and Kinloch alone offered little chance for financial success, the court of appeals upheld the
three-district plan submitted by state and county officials 294 and approved by the district court as "the least disruptive alternative which
is educationally sound, administratively feasible, and which promises to
achieve at least the minimum amount of desegregation that is constitutionally required. 29 5
The rationale of the United States v. Missouri decision, particularly
the connection between the Kinloch district's present racial composition
and the past state-imposed segregation, as well as the racially discriminatory basis for failing to include the district in reorganization plans,
can be applied to other cases in which a predominantly black urban
district in a state previously requiring segregation is surrounded by white
the only reason that Kinloch had not been included in previous reorganization plans
"was the opposition, based on racial consideration, of the surrounding districts to
numerous proposals to alter that situation, including the rejection by the electorate of the
1949 reorganization plan." Id. at 1059-60.
290. 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals modified the district court
order, however, by reducing the maximum tax rate set by the district court. Id. at 1373.
291. Id. at 1369.
292. See note 288 supra.
293. 515 F.2d at 1371.
294. Id. The district court had emphasized that the interdistrict remedy was "substantially consistent" with Missouri law and would not "result in extensive disruption of
public education in Missouri." Id. at 1370.
295. Id. at 1371, quoting 388 F. Supp. at 159. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court. 96 S. Ct. 374 (1975). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell favored a grant
of certiorari limited to the question of whether the federal district court had the power
"to fix and impose the school tax rate upon the residents of the consolidated school district without allowing the rate to be determined in accordance with Missouri law." Id.
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suburban districts. By the same token, without regard to any history of
state-imposed segregation, whenever the effect of a school district reorganization is the encirclement of a predominantly or disproportionately
black school district by one or more virtually all white districts, a strong
argument can be made that "school district lines were deliberately
drawn on the basis of race."2 96 Although the Court in Milliken used
the language of "deliberately drawn," this language, like the "segregative intent" language of Keyes,2 7 must be read in light of the principle
that discriminatory effect rather than discriminatory purpose is the test
in racial discrimination claims. Certainly, if after a reorganization of
school districts, a predominantly or disproportionately black school
district is surrounded by one or more virtually all white districts, there is
at least a presumption that this resultant effect was not "accidental. 20 8
A case exemplifying the importance of discriminatory effect is Hoots
v. Pennsylvania,299 decided the year before Milliken. The state board
of education in 1971 had approved a school reorganization plan establishing six school districts in a portion of Allegheny County, east of the
city of Pittsburgh. One of these districts, the General Braddock Area
School District, included the only three school districts in the area
having any substantial black population. 800 The district court found
that the neighboring school districts had "continually sought to avoid
being included in a school district with"'301 these districts because of the
latters' high concentration of black students. It also found that there
were a number of other ways in which the school districts in the area
could have been reorganized, that reorganization plans including these
three districts with other districts had been proposed, but were rejected,
and that the present reorganization plan disregarded the promulgated
state board standards for school reorganization as well as recognized
296. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
297. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
298. By analogy to Keyes, the burden to rebut "segregative intent" should be on the
state. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
299. 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1973), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
300. Id. at 819. The General Braddock Area School District was 45 percent black.
The other five districts had from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 9.6 percent black
enrollment. Of the 46 districts in Allegheny County outside the City of Pittsburgh, only
15 had a black enrollment in excess of 5 percent, only four had a black enrollment in
excess of 30 percent, and only one district other than General Braddock had a black
enrollment in excess of 40 percent. Id. at 816.
301. Id.
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educational standards.3
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Concluding that the actions of the state and

county boards in establishing the boundary lines for the General Braddock Area School District were unconstitutional as the equivalent of
drawing of school district lines on the basis of race,30 3 the court directed

the state and county officials to present a comprehensive desegregation
plan for the entire area to remedy the constitutional violations.30 4
The same result, in my view, would clearly prevail after Milliken.
Whenever there has been a reorganization of school districts and the
effect has been to create one or more districts that are disproportionately
black in student composition, it can generally be shown, as Hoots
indicates, that school district lines were "deliberately drawn on the basis
of race.13 05 The district court may make a specific finding to that
effect, as in Hoots, but even if it does not, the resulting discriminatory

effect should be sufficient to establish a constitutional violation and to
require the redrawing of school district lines. Similarly, whenever
adjoining school districts have refused to merge or consolidate pursuant

to the provisions of state law, and it can be shown that the refusal to do
so was based on considerations of race, the failure to merge or consoli-

date may itself constitute an act of racial discrimination that can be
remedied only by court-ordered merger or consolidation.
For example, in Clark v. Board of Education,30 a pre-Milliken case

in which I was counsel for the plaintiffs, suit was brought to require the
302. Id. at 820.
303. In so holding, the court noted that: (1) public school authorities had made
"educational policy decisions which were based wholly or in part on considerations of the
race of students and which contributed to increasing racial segregation in the public
schools;" (2) the boards were "accountable for the natural, probable and foreseeable
consequences of their policies and practices," and had built upon existing patterns of
residential segregation to preserve segregation in the schools; and (3) the "natural,
foreseeable and actual effect of combining [the three school districts] into a single
school district was to perpetuate, exacerbate and maximize segregation of school pupils."
Id. at 822-23.
304. The state and county defendants filed a proposed desegregation plan that
included additional districts and did not appeal the district court's order. When two
affected districts sought to intervene as defendants to take an appeal, their petitions were
denied as untimely; they had been notified of the litigation before the original trial and
had been urged by the Attorney-General of Pennsylvania to intervene at that time. On
appeal, the denial of the petitions to intervene was affirmed, thus dismissing the
attempted appeal on the merits. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974).
305. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
306. 350 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
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merger of the Shelbyville and Shelby County school districts. Both
districts were relatively small Kentucky districts, the Shelbyville district
having about 1800 students, 30 percent of whom were black, and the
Shelby County district having about 2800 students, only five percent of
whom were black.307

We contended that the refusal of the county

district to merge with the Shelbyville district was based upon explicitly
racial reasons and thus constituted racial discrimination against the
black plaintiffs. 308 In overruling the school boards' motion to dismiss,
the district court summarized our position as follows:
That the Kentucky Department of Education has for some time recommended hat the two school districts merge, but that they have
refused to do so because the Shelbyville School "District has a substantially larger proportion of black students so that in the event of merger
the County Board would have the responsibility of educating those
black students, which responsibility it (,the Shelby County District)
309
(does) not wish to assume.

The district court held that it had the power to order the districts to
merge if a merger was necessary to protect federal constitutional rights
and that it would order a merger if, as alleged, separate districts were
maintained for purposes of racial discrimination.110
In cases of this kind, the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent,
for without a showing of such intent, the failure to merge would not
constitute racial discrimination. Although we thought that we could
put together a fairly strong showing of discriminatory intent, it became
unnecessary. Having lost the motion to dismiss, the Shelbyville board
reassessed its position3 1 ' and, following the election of a new board
307. Id. at 150. In this case, as in the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation, the
school district lines did not follow political boundaries. Some of the essentially rural
parts of the county were included within the Shelbyville School District, and white
parents residing in these areas wanted a merger with the Shelbyville County district
because the district offered agricultural courses and its schedule was geared to farming
operations. These parents, the "silent plaintiffs" in the case, had brought suit in state
court to challenge a bond issue for a new, much-needed high school in Shelbyville.
308. We also contended that because the Shelby County district had substantially
greater taxable wealth than the Shelbyville district, the students in Shelbyville were being
denied equality of educational opportunity. Rodriguez had not been decided.
309. 350 F. Supp. at 150.
310. In this part of our argument we had relied primarily on Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), and the district court accepted our position. See 350 F. Supp. at
152.
311. As a practical matter, everything depended on our winning the motion to
dismiss. The pendency of our suit, coupled with the state court suit challenging the
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member, voted to initiate merger proceedings, which the State Board
ordered. Thus the case became moot. I think it is clear under Milliken
that if the refusal of adjoining districts to merge or consolidate is shown

to have been based on racial considerations-and the district court's
factual finding on this point will be all-important-there will exist a case
3' 12
of school district lines "deliberately drawn on the basis of race,"
which can be remedied only by ordering the districts to merge or
consolidate in accordance with the applicable provisions of state law.
Whenever a disproportionately black urban school district adjacent to
virtually all white suburban districts has been specifically excluded by
state law from a major school district reorganization effort, a strong
argument can be made that the effect of such exclusion is that discriminatory acts of state officials have substantially caused interdistrict segre-

gation.

13

This ground was one of those relied upon by the three-judge

court in Evans v. Buchanan 1 4 in holding that metropolitan desegrega-

tion could be ordered and an interdistrict remedy imposed to eliminate
the segregation existing within the Wilmington School District. In 1968

legislation was enacted 315 to "provide the framework for an effective
and orderly reorganization of the existing school districts of this
State."

1

It specifically provided that: "The proposed school district

for the City of Wilmington shall be the City of Wilmington with the
territory within its limits."3 1

At the time the legislation was enacted,

the New Castle County school enrollment, including Wilmington, was
83 percent white and 17 percent black, while the Wilmington school
legality of the bond issue, see note 307 supra, made the bonds unmarketable and
prevented the building of the new high school that Shelbyville needed if it were to
continue to operate as a separate district. In addition, the pendency of our suit and the
prospect of an eventual trial heightened the political pressure being exerted on the
Shelbyville board to merge. The merger was an issue in the upcoming Shelbyville board
election, and when a "pro-merger" candidate was elected, there was a majority on the
Shelbyville board favoring merger.
312. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
313. See text accompanying notes 186-90 supra.
314. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), af'd mem., 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975).
315. Educational Advancement Act of 1968, ch. 292, § 6, 56 Del. Laws 977 (codified
at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1001-94 (1974)).
316. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1001 (1974).
317. Id. § 1004(c)(4). Wilmington would also have been implicitly excluded by §
1004(c) (2), which limited the maximum enrollment in any proposed school district to
12,000. Newark, a virtually all white district in New Castle County with an enrollment
of approximately 12,000 students, was the one other Delaware district affected by §
1004(c) (4). See 393 F. Supp. at 438-39.
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enrollment alone was 66 percent black and 34 percent white. 818
In a two-to-one decision, the court held that the specific exclusion of

Wilmington from school district reorganizations constituted an act of
racial discrimination. Because Wilmington had "historically been treated
distinctively in Delaware education," because no reference to race
appeared in either the legislation or the legislative debates, and because
"all Wilmington legislators, black and white, voted for the legislation,"

the court was unwilling to find the legislature's action to be "purposefully racially discriminatory."8 19 Nevertheless, the court looked to the

racially discriminatory effect of the exclusion. The exclusion of the
Wilmington district from possible school reorganization meant that 75
percent of all the black children in New Castle County-the ones who
resided in the Wilmington School District, the only predominantly black
school district in the state-could not be included in any reorganization
plan.320 The court likened this exclusion to a racial classification, to be
treated as "inherently suspect' and to be tested against the compelling

state interest standard. As a result of the legislative exclusion, the state
board "could not have significantly reduced the growing racial isolation
in New Castle County schools had it chosen to do sO. ''321 When the
court considered the purportedly compelling interests advanced in favor
of the exclusion, it found them wanting.3 22 In considering the implications of Milliken, the court concluded that the unconstitutional exclusion
318. 393 F. Supp. at 439.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 439-40.
321. Id. at 442. At the time the statute was enacted, Wilmington had not eliminated
the vestiges of state-imposed segregation and was still practicing de jure segregation. In
the court's view, the effect of the statute was to make "consolidation promoting racial
balance substantially less accessible than other education strategies," and therefore the
fact that the Newark district was also excluded from school reorganizations did not
"mitigate the racially specific effect of the Act." Id.; see note 317 supra.
322. The following interests were advanced: (1) a belief, which the court found to be
erroneous, that the state constitution required a two-thirds majority of each house of the
legislature in order to alter the Wilmington School District's boundaries and that
excluding Wilmington was therefore necessary to secure passage of the general reorganization act; (2) the coterminous quality of the Wilmington city and school district
boundaries, which the court discounted in terms of a "compelling state interest" because
students from throughout New Castle County had for many years attended school in
Wilmington and because there was no requirement that city boundaries be observed in
regard to other consolidations; and (3) the size of the Wilmington district and the
12,000-student limitation on the size of reorganized districts, which the court found
rational but not "compelling" because educational experts disagreed on the desirable
maximum size of school districts. 393 F. Supp. at 443-45.
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of Wilmington from possible school reorganization "plainly constitutes
an 'inter-district violation.'

",323

Although, as will be discussed shortly,

the majority in Evans advanced other grounds for imposing an interdistrict remedy, the majority also made it clear that the statutory exclusion
3 24
alone would have been a sufficient basis.
Closely related to the exclusion of a disproportionately black school
district from possible school reorganization is the exclusion of school

districts from metropolitan consolidation plans so that a disproportionately black urban school district will remain separate from the suburban
districts while other governmental functions are consolidated on a
metropolitan basis.32 5 In United States v. Board of School Commissioners,328 the Seventh Circuit had before it a metropolitan de-

segregation plan designed to remedy the de jure segregation existing
within the Indianapolis School District. The plan included 19 school
districts in and adjacent to Marion County, the county in which Indianapolis is located, although the Indianapolis School District was the only
district shown to have committed any acts of de jure segregation. 2 7
Because the district court in approving the interdistrict plan had relied

on essentially the same analysis as that used by the lower courts in
Milliken, 28 after the Supreme Court decided Milliken the Seventh
Circuit set aside the plan and reversed the district court with respect to
323. Id. at 445.
324. The dissenting judge took the position that the statute's exclusion of Wilmington
from possible reorganization did not change "the status quo so as to have interdistrict
effect" and that it did not constitute a "suspect racial classification." Id. at 450
(dissenting opinion).
325. Although school districts have traditionally not been included in metropolitan
consolidation plans, it is difficult to see why this should be the case. As a practical
matter, the school districts are not included today because when the effect of metropolitan consolidation would be to combine urban and suburban school districts, white
middle-class surburbanites would overwhelmingly vote against merger. See United States
v. Board of School Comm'rs, Civil No. 68-225, at 3-5 (S.D. Ind., Aug. 1, 1975)
(memorandum of decision). As it is, urban blacks tend to lose in all aspects of
metropolitan consolidations. They lose by consolidation whatever political power they
have because of their greater concentration within the central city, without gaining the
benefit of a broader tax base to be used for the education of their children, let alone the
elimination of racially segregated schools within the urban school district. Recently the
Supreme Court held that the dilution of black political power by metropolitan consolidation is not violative of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
326. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
327. Id. at 79.
328. See id. at 78-80.
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those school districts located outside Marion County. With respect to
those districts located within Marion County, however, the court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings. The importance of the
county boundaries was due primarily to the legislature's enactment in
1969 of the Uni-Gov Act,12 9 which consolidated the City of Indianapolis and Marion County into a unified metropolitan city government but
expressly provided that the boundaries of the Indianapolis School Dis-

trict would not be affected by the expansion. 3 0° The Seventh Circuit
directed the district court to determine whether the establishment of the

Uni-Gov boundaries without a like reestablishment of the boundaries
of the Indianapolis School District "warrants an inter-district remedy
within Uni-Gov in accordance with Milliken.' 's '
On remand, the district court resolved the issue in the affirmative,
ordering an interdistrict remedy including all of Marion County.83 2 In
its opinion, the court expanded the findings of fact-obviously in light
of Milliken-to form a broader basis for the remedy it imposed.
First, drawing upon the concurrence of Justice Stewart that "'purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws' "3 by
state officials might call for an interdistrict remedy, the court specifically
found that the location of public housing projects by state instrumentalities had "obviously tended to cause and to perpetuate the segregation of

black pupils in" the Indianapolis School District. 34 The court further
329. Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 173, [1969] Ind. Acts 357 (codified at IND. ANN.
STAT. CODE §§ 18-4-1-1 to -4-15-2 (Bums 1974).
330. IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 184-3-14 (Bums 1974).
331. 503 F.2d at 86. The court noted that in Milliken the coterminous boundaries of
the city of Detroit and the Detroit School District were "'established over a century ago
by neutral legislation when the city was incorporated."' Id. at 86 n.22, quoting Milliken

v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974).

The failure to include the Indianapolis School

District within Uni-Gov might constitute the situation in which "'racially discriminatory
acts of the state ... have been a substantial cause of inter-district segregation."' Id. at
86 n.23, quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
332. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, Civil No. 68-225 (S.D. Ind., Aug. 1,
1975) (memorandum of decision and judgment). The remedy included two cities and
one town that were excluded from the Indianapolis metropolitan consolidation plans under Uni-Gov.
333. Civil No. 68-225, at 2 (memorandum of decision), quoting Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (concurring opinion).
334. Civil No. 68-225, at 3 (memorandum of decision). All housing projects had
been located within the Indianapolis School District boundaries and notably 98 percent
of all project residents (excluding projects for the elderly) were black. The state
instrumentalities to which the court referred were the Metropolitan Development Commission of Marion County, which had county-wide zoning authority, and The Housing
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found that the suburban Marion County school districts had "consistently resisted the movement of black citizens or black pupils into their
territory," resisted school consolidation, and resisted "erection of public
housing projects outside" the Indianapolis School District. 3 5 Reemphasizing the state's affirmative duty to assist in desegregating the
Indianapolis School District because the state had promoted segregation
and inhibited desegregation in the past within the district,"3 6 the court
noted that in 1974 the state legislature had taken certain steps facilitating interdistrict relief in recognition of this duty.3 3 7 Taken in conjunction with the court's earlier findings that a unitary school system could
not be implemented within the city district alone because the system
would be unworkable, these new findings and developments led the
court to conclude that the fourteenth amendment compelled the court to
order transfers of black students from the Indianapolis School District to
the surrounding suburban school districts to effect a constitutionally
33 8
acceptable desegregation of the Indianapolis School District.
In essence, the district court in the Indianapolis case demonstrated the
same "institutional behavior" as the court of appeals in the LouisvilleJefferson County case-that is, it focused on the particular circumstances that were present and advanced as many grounds as possible to
justify imposing an interdistrict remedy. The federal district court in
Evans v. Buchanan exhibited a similar institutional behavior. In addition to the statutory exclusion from reorganization ground discussed
Authority of the City of Indianapolis, which had authority to locate housing projects up
to five miles outside the city corporation limits. Id. As part of the relief ordered, the
Housing Authority of the City of Indianapolis was enjoined from locating any additional
public housing units within the boundaries of the Indianapolis School District. Id. at
11.
335. Id. at 3.
336. Id. at 4. The court of appeals had concurred with this finding. 503 F.2d at 80.
337. Civil No. 68-225, at 5 (memorandum of decision); see Act of Feb. 20, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 94 § 1, [1974] Ind. Acts 345 (codified at IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 20-8.16.5-1 to -10 (Burns 1975)). The statute provided the means for paying the costs of
interdistrict transfers required by the fourteenth amendment and ordered by the courts.
338. Civil No. 68-225, at 7 (memorandum of decision). The court's conclusion
matched the finding required by the Indiana legislature for applicability of the statutory
interdistrict transfer regulations. See IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 20-8.1-6.5-1(c) (Bums
1975). In determining the particular relief to be ordered, the court gave special
attention to the probability of white flight. The court specifically declined to order
desegregation within the Indianapolis School District alone because this "would immediately accelerate white flight and unbalance the entire system beyond saving." Civil No.
68-225, at 8, supra. During the 1974-75 school year, the city system was 42.43 percent
black while the suburban school districts were virtually all white. Id.
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above,33 9 the Evans court relied on two other grounds as well: (1) the
historic, if not continuing, interrelationship between Wilmington and the
suburban districts in pre-Brown days, and (2) the actions of the state in
producing racial residential segregation between the urban and suburban areas.
Wilmington, like many urban districts, had witnessed the movement
of whites from the city to the suburbs.340 While its population decreased in absolute terms, its proportionate black population had tripled
since 1950. In 1973 the racial composition of the Wilmington schools
was approximately 83 percent black while that of the surrounding
suburban school districts in New Castle County 34 1 was only 6 percent
black, resulting in an overall racial composition of 17 percent black and
83 percent white.3 42 Clearly, this was a case in which a desegregation
plan limited to the urban district alone would be ineffective, but in
which metropolitan desegregation would be fully effective to end the
constitutional violation existing within the Wilmington district.
As its first step, the court looked at the interrelationship between the
Wilmington and suburban school districts and found that in pre-Brown
days, all the black high school students in the county attended Howard
High School in Wilmington. Moreover, black elementary and junior
high students from the suburban areas often attended black schools in
Wilmington so that, "to a significant extent, black schools in Wilmington under the de jure system were schools for black children from
throughout New Castle County."3 43 In addition, white children residing
in the suburban districts often attended white schools in Wilmington.
This interrelationship between Wilmington and the suburban districts, however, was not a continuing one as it was in LouisvilleJefferson County. After Brown, the suburban black students attended
schools within their own districts, and as the suburban districts expanded, the districts were able to educate all their students in their own
schools. Nevertheless, it was at least arguable that when there was an
interrelationship between the districts for the purpose of facilitating
339. See text accompanying notes 313-24 supra.
340. By the 1970 census, 43 percent of Wilmington's residents were black, but only
4.5 percent of the suburban residents were black. See Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp.
428, 432 (D. Del.), affd mem., 96 S.Ct. 381 (1975).
341. New Castle County included Wilmington.
342. 393 F. Supp. at 433.
343. Id.
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state-imposed segregation, it is not beyond the power of the federal
court to treat the districts as a single unit in order to effect the desegregation constitutionally required of the urban district.
The court then turned to governmental responsibility for racial residential segregation between the urban and suburban areas in an illustration of what Justice Stewart may have meant by "purposeful, racially
44
discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws":1
The growth of identifiably black schools [within Wilmington] mirrored
population shifts in New Castle County. To a significant extent these
demographic changes, i.e., the net outmigration of white population and
increase of city black population in the last two decades, resulted not
exclusively from individual residential choice and economics, but also
from assistance, encouragement, and authorization by governmental
5
policies. 34
The court then ticked off these governmental polices: (1) Federal
Housing Administration policies, which until 1949 "advocated racially
and economically homogeneous neighborhoods;"3 46 (2) continued
recording of racially restrictive covenants in New Castle County real
estate deeds until 1973; (3) language in a Delaware Real Estate Commission publication "making racial discrimination a matter of realtor
ethics," language which was not eliminated from the state publication
until 1970;14 7 (4) the minimal number of public housing units operated

outside the City of Wilmington by the Wilmington Housing Authority
despite its jurisdiction until 1972 to establish such units up to five miles
beyond the city limits; (5) the complete failure of the New Castle
County Housing Authority, created in 1972, to build any housing units
in the suburbs or to obtain the necessary rezoning or site approval from
the New Castle County Council; 48 (6) certain policies of the Wilming344. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (concurring opinion).
345. 393 F. Supp. at 434.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 434-35. The language in question was contained in a document reprinting
the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards:
A realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a
character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or
any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values
in that neighborhood.
393 F. Supp. at 434. A survey of the period from 1965 to 1967 indicated that while 51
percent of the housing listed for sale in Wilmington was "open" to blacks, only 7 percent
of the housing listed for sale in the suburbs was similarly "open." Id. at 435.
348. Id.
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ton School Board, such as optional attendance zoning, which resulted in
a proportionately larger black population in the schools from which the
whites transferred; 49 and (7) state-subsidized transportation of students to private and parochial schools outside the student's assigned
public school district, which enabled whites living in Wilmington to
attend parochial and private schools in New Castle County. 0 The
court concluded:
Governmental authorities condoned and encouraged discrimination in
the private housing market and provided public housing almost exclusively within the confines of Wilmington. The specific effect of these
policies was to restrict the availability of private and public housing to
blacks in suburban New Castle County at a time when housing became
increasingly available to them in Wilmington .... [G]overnmental
authorities are responsible to a significant degree for the increasing disparity in residential and school populations between Wilmington and its
suburbs in the past two decades. 35 '
In summary then, the three-judge district court held that an interdistrict remedy was justified in Wilmington-New Castle County because
(1) at the time of Brown, de jure segregation in New Castle County was
a cooperative venture involving both city and suburbs so that in 1954, a
desegregation decree could properly have considered city and suburbs
together for purposes of remedy;85 2 (2) since that time, although the
school districts had operated independently of one another, "governmental authorities [had] contributed to the racial isolation of city from
suburbs [so that] -the racial characteristics of city and suburban schools
are still interrelated;" ' 53 and (3) the statutory exclusion of Wilmington
from school reorganization had a racially discriminatory effect. Taken
together, these three grounds justified imposing an interdistrict remedy
in the case.

54

349. Id. at 435-36. These policies may have been designed to minimize the movement of white families to the suburbs, but they seemed to have the opposite effect.
350. Id. at 436.

351. Id. at 438.
352. Id. at 437. In this connection, the court cited Wright and Scotland Neck, which
I see as being similar to the area of desegregation approach that we used in the
Louisville-Jefferson County litigation. See text accompanying notes 262-63 supra.
353. Id. at 438.
354. The court noted that the remedy would be limited to New Castle County and
involve, at most, twelve school districts totalling less than 88,000 students. In addition,
Delaware history and law provided for interdistrict arrangements short of consolidation.
Id. at 446.
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Because the three-judge district court had granted injunctive relief,
the case was directly appealable to the Supreme Court.3 55 If the Court

had been disposed to expand on its holding in Milliken, or if it had been
disposed at this time to consider placing further barriers in the path of

metropolitan desegregation, it would have noted probable jurisdiction.
Instead, it summarily affirmed the decision of the three-judge district
court.35 6 The summary affirmance is significant, both legally and

behaviorally. In the view of many observers, a summary affirmance
does not necessarily indicate agreement with the decision of the lower
court and may not be significantly different from a denial of certiorari in
the sense that it merely indicates that the Court does not wish to

consider the question. Nevertheless, the binding effect of the decision
on the lower federal courts is the same as if it had been handed down
after plenary review. 357 To put it another way, unless and until the
Supreme Court grants review in another case involving metropolitan
desegregation and the crossing of school district lines, its summary

affirmance of Evans constitutes, for precedential purposes, an endorsement of the grounds relied on by the district court in ordering interdis355. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
356. 96 S. Ct. 381 (1975). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell and Chief
Justice Burger, dissented on jurisdictional and procedural grounds from the Court's
summary affirmance of the district court decision. He first argued that the case was
properly before a three-judge district court only on the basis that the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the operation of the 1968 school consolidation statute, which had excluded
Wilmington from its provisions. The three-judge district court did in fact enjoin the
Delaware State Board of Education from relying on the statutes provisions, but since the
authority granted under that statute had expired by its own force on July 1, 1969, Justice
Rehnquist contended that the issue of the statute's constitutionality was moot. Therefore,
the three-judge district court should not have passed upon the statute, and should have
dissolved itself. Since the court did not do so, the only proper action for the Supreme
Court, according to Justice Rehnquist, was to reverse the granting of injunctive relief and
to remand the case so that the case could proceed before a single-judge court. 96 S. Ct. at
387. Second, no matter how the court ruled on the granting of the injunction against the
enforcement of the 1968 statute, Justice Rehnquist seriously doubted that the Court had
jurisdiction to deal with the "Milliken issues" at all on the appeal and opined that the
Court should have noted probable jurisdiction to resolve the question. Id. at 382, 384.
He strongly lamented the fact that "[tjhe Court's summary affirmance . . . not only
wrongfully upholds an erroneous injunction issued by the District Court, but because of
the difficult jurisdictional questions present in this case leaves totally beclouded and
uncertain what is decided by that summary affirmance." Id. at 382.
357. As the Court has recently stated: "the lower courts are bound by summary
decisions of this Court 'until such time as the Court informs [them] that [they] are
not."' Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). See also Thonen v. Jenkins,
517 F.2d 3, 7 (4th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Hodgson, 500 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1974).
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trict relief in Evans. This endorsement gives greater cogency both to
those grounds when they are subsequently relied on in other cases and to
the granting of interdistrict relief generally. Although lower courts
recognize that the endorsement is a limited one, 8 8 nonetheless, from a
behavioral standpoint, they can see that the Supreme Court is not
disposed at this time to place further barriers in the way of metropolitan
desegregation or to review decisions of lower federal courts granting
such relief.3 59 This awareness, coupled with the demonstrated "institutional behavior" of the lower courts that have dealt with metropolitan
desegregation problems in the wake of Milliken, can only encourage
other courts to follow in the path of Evans. Thus, the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance of Evans must be viewed, at least at this time, as a
strong plus in the struggle for metropolitan desegregation.
The only unsuccessful "contemporary Milliken" case that research
has disclosed is Wheeler v. Durham City Board of Education,00 which
was decided by the district court shortly before Milliken and, in the
court's view, reinforced by it.361 In Wheeler, both the Durham City and
Durham County school districts were operating under court-ordered
desegregation plans when the suit was brought, and the district court
essentially based its decision on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bradley
v. School Board. 62 Although the plaintiffs may have been proceeding
primarily with a "state responsibility" approach in the hopes that the
Supreme Court would accept this approach in Milliken and thus effec358. With respect to the limited weight that the Court itself gives to summary
affirmances, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
359. The denial of certiorari in United States v. Missouri, see note 295 supra, lends
some further credence to this observation.
360. 379 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D.N.C. 1974), afrd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975). The denial of interdistrict relief was not
appealed. 521 F.2d at 1138.
In Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975), a desegregation case involving the
Dallas Independent School District, a group of intervenors sought the joinder of other
independent school districts in the Dallas metropolitan area and the formulation of a
metropolitan desegregation plan. It did not appear that the intervenors had introduced
any evidence on this issue, which was held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's
resolution of Milliken. In dismissing the intervenors' claim, the Fifth Circuit merely
noted, "There is in this record no suggestion of violation by the outlying independent
school districts in Dallas County of these [the Milliken] principles so as to warrant
imposition of a multi-district plan." 517 F.2d at 109.
361. 379 F. Supp. at 1376 (unnumbered footnote added after the Milliken decision).
362. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), afj'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92
(1973). See text accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
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tively overrule Bradley, there were other factors present in the case that
might have supported an interdistrict remedy on grounds recognized in
other "contemporary Milliken" cases.
If the Durham City and Durham County districts had been merged,
the county-wide ratio would have been 58 percent white to 42 percent
black. As separate districts, the city district was 71 percent black to 29
percent white and the county district was 75 percent white to 25 percent
black. 38 In 1958 and again in 1971, the city and county boards of
education voted to merge the two districts. Under state law, however,
this decision was subject to public referendum, and both times the
proposal was decisively and "overwhelmingly rejected. 30 4 Presumably,
it is not possible to show discriminatory intent by a voter rejection of the
merger. Nevertheless, the argument could be advanced that the voters'
action, which constitutes state action for constitutional purposes, 3 5 has
a racially discriminatory effect because it has caused the retention of two
separate districts, one predominantly white and one predominantly
black, in an area having a close balance between the races. In addition,
the school district lines did not follow political boundaries; if they had,
the Durham City district would have been "less black." Although the
court held that there was "simply no showing that the purpose or effect
of this practice was to perpetuate a dual school system," 366 the fact remains that, as in Louisville-Jefferson County, this distinct districting
practice contributed to the degree of racial segregation existing within
the city system. It does not appear that the plaintiffs attempted to show
an interrelationship between the two systems for segregatory or other
purposes, but if they had, the district court, relying on Bradley, would
have been unlikely to have considered the argument. Nor, finally, was
there any effort to show governmental responsibility for the residential
racial disparity between the city and county districts. If the case had
been brought after Miliken, the plaintiffs might well have proceeded
differently, and the court might have been more responsive to their arguments.
The "governmental responsibility for interdistrict residential segregation" argument that was recognized by the three-judge district court in
Evans may receive further clarification from the Supreme Court's review
363.
364.
365.
366.

379 F. Supp. at 1360.
Id.at 1364.
See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
379 F. Supp. at 1371.
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of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority.a67 In Gautreaux, the Seventh Circuit held that any plan to

remedy the racially discriminatory public housing system found to exist
within the City of Chicago

68

would have to be implemented on a

metropolitan basis and that the district court had the power to impose
such a plan. The court emphasized the limited nature of the Milliken
holding, noting that "any application of the opinion to factual situations
other than the one before the Court would be dictum 8 00 and that public
housing was a federally supervised program based on federal statutes

and did not have a deeply rooted tradition of local control. More
significantly for our purposes, there was evidence of discrimination by
the suburban areas themselves in that most of the suburban housing

projects were located in or adjacent to overwhelmingly black census
tracts. 370 The court concluded: "The extra-city impact of defendants'
intra-city discrimination appears to be profound and far-reaching and
has affected the housing patterns of hundreds of thousands of people

throughout the Chicago metropolitan region."3s 71 This impact, for the
court, was the kind of showing required by Milliken for a metropolitan

remedy-that is, "'a constitutional violation within one district that
produces a significant segregative effect in another district.' ,372 If the
Supreme Court agrees that a metropolitan remedy may be imposed in
the public housing situation, because discrimination in public housing
has a metropolitan-wide effect, this decision will in turn give impetus to
the argument that "governmental responsibility for interdistrict residential segregation" justifies imposing an interdistrict remedy to deal with
8
the school segregation that follows in its path. 73
367. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 962 (1975).
368. For the history of this protracted litigation and the unconstitutional actions on
the part of the Chicago Housing Authority, see 503 F.2d at 932-34.
369. Id.at 936.
370. Id. at 937.
371. Id. at 940.
372. Id., quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
373. The metropolitan-wide effect of discrimination in public housing is an important
part of the suit seeking metropolitan school desegregation in the Atlanta area. The suit
is now pending before a three-judge court in the Northern District of Georgia. Armour
v. Nix, Civil No. 16708 (N.D. Ga.). In Atlanta there has already been a finding of
racial discrimination in public housing similar to that in Gautreaux. Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). In the Atlanta
case, reliance is also being placed on the history of "cooperation" between Atlanta and
the surrounding suburban districts in pre-Brown days and thereafter and on state law
authorizing "regional cooperation" between school districts.
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What stands out most clearly in the "institutional behavior" of the
lower federal courts in the wake of Milliken is that the courts have not
viewed Milliken as precluding them from imposing interdistrict remedies. Quite to the contrary, they have delimited the negative parts of
Milliken to a rejection of only the particular theory of metropolitan
desegregation advanced in Milliken and have affirmatively used Milliken to justify imposing an interdistrict remedy in the case before them.
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Evans can only serve to
strengthen this view of Milliken. This "institutional behavior," it is
submitted, clearly lends empirical support for the approach advocated in
this Article.
VII.

PROGNOSIS AND CONCLUSION

The essential aim of this Article has been to demonstrate that although a "big battle" was lost in Milliken, "small wars" can still be won,
and that, by emphasizing the circumstances of particular cases, it is still
possible to achieve metropolitan desegregation and an interdistrict remedy in a number of areas. In Milliken the Supreme Court came to a
"fork in the road," in which the Court's commitment to racial equality
and equality of educational opportunity for black children clashed with
the perceived class interest of white middle-class Americans in maintaining the educational advantages derived from racially and socially homogeneous suburban school districts for their own children. The Court
was badly split, and its ambivalence is clearly reflected in the majority
decision, as well as the concurrence of Justice Stewart. What the Court
did was to reject the "easy route" to metropolitan desegregation, that of
showing a constitutional violation on the part of the urban district and
overall state responsibility for education. At the same time the Court
affirmatively recognized that federal courts do have the power to cross
school district lines and to order metropolitan desegregation in appropriate cases. The issue remaining after Milliken has been the identification
of these appropriate circumstances. In this Article, I have delineated
what I think they are, looking both to what the Court majority said in
Milliken as an indication of its future behavior and to other grounds that
have been advanced in post-Milliken cases.
It is obviously hazardous to venture a prediction about what the
Supreme Court will do when the question comes before it again, and the
Court's summary affirmance of Evans indicates some doubt about when,
if ever in the near future, this issue will be before the Court. If I am
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correct in my analysis of the majority's ambivalence, and particularly in
light of the recent "institutional behavior" exhibited by the lower federal
courts, I do not think it likely that a majority of the Court-and here I
put great weight on Justice Stewart's "special ambivalence"-wil try to
extend Milliken to place further barriers in the path of metropolitan
desegregation. Nor do I think that the Court will attempt to formulate
broad principles to guide the course of future litigation, at least at this
time. Rather the Court will treat Milliken as standing for the proposition that imposing an interdistrict remedy is proper in the circumstances
of particular cases and improper if it is based solely on the grounds that
one district is in violation and the state has overall responsibility for
education. In the "special circumstances" of a particular case, the
Court, if it should grant plenary review, is likely to find, as the lower
federal courts have done in the wake of Milliken, that an interdistrict
remedy is appropriate. In any event, the advocates of metropolitan
desegregation certainly should proceed on this assumption unless and
until the Supreme Court sends out a different "behavioral message."
In time, I believe Milliken may simply come to stand for the proposition that federal courts do have the power to impose an interdistrict
remedy in appropriate cases, and what constitutes an appropriate case
will be left largely for the lower federal courts to define.37 4 If my
analysis should turn out to be correct, it may yet be that black and white
children in many of the major metropolitan areas will in fact go to
school together, which "in the final analysis is what desegregation of
''
the public schools is all about. s7h
374. In large part this approach has been adopted by the Court in cases involving the

adequacy of desegregation plans designed after Swann to eliminate the vestiges of stateimposed segregation. The Court has consistently denied certiorari in such cases. See,
e.g., Northeross v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
962 (1974); Medley v. School Bd., 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1172 (1974); Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1171 (1974). Similarly, the Court may consistently deny review in cases involving
the imposition of an interdistrict remedy.
375. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 802 (1974) (Marshall, J.,dissenting).

